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REGULATING DISCRETIONARY MANAGEMENT:
BROKER-DEALERS AS CATALYSTS
FOR REFORM
HARVEY E. BINES *
Over the last decade, there has been a remarkable increase in
the number of broker-dealers offering or promoting discretionary
management services.' In "discretionary" accounts, authority is
granted an investment manager to make investment decisions and
execute them for the benefit of a client without the obligation of
consulting with, or obtaining prior approval from, the client. 2 An
increasing number of houses are offering discretionary man-
agement services directly or through affiliates, and they are actively
soliciting clients to turn their accounts over for expert management.
Other broker-dealers, not offering discretionary management ser-
vices themselves or through affiliates, are referring customers to
investment advisers who in turn pay compensation for the referrals
or rely on referring broker-dealers for executions and custody of
client accounts. 3
* 13.5., 1963, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., 1970, University of Virginia;
Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
This article, in a modified form, will appear in a book on the law of investment
management to be published by Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc. I wish to express my
gratitude to friends and colleagues who read this manuscript before publication and to
members of the staff of the Division of Investment Management Regulation of the SEC with
whom I worked last summer. Responsibility for the ideas expressed here is mine, but the
value of their influence should not be underestimated. I also am deeply indebted to Stephen
R. Kroft of the University of Virginia, class of 1975, for the invaluable research and editorial
assistance he provided in the preparation of this article.
In 1962, national securities exchange members earned profits of $11.2 million from
investment advisory services, while the total in 1969 was $43.6 million, In the latter year, ten
percent of the members of the New York Stock Exchange had advisory-fee income totaling
five percent or more of their commission income, while two percent of the firms derived
twenty-five percent or more of their commission from that source. SEC, Institutional Investor
Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc, No. 92-64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2297 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Institutional Investor Study]. The broker-dealer who
manages discretionary accounts may gain a significant competitive advantage over other firms
that serve only as brokers. See Wells, Should Money Management and Brokerage Be Sepa- •
rated?, Institutional Investor, June, 1971, at 22. Some firms have begun to specialize in
combining the duties of the broker-dealer with those of the adviser or manager. See Bernstein,
The Specialized Brokerage Firm and the Discretionary Account, in Institutional Investors in a
Changing Economy 231 (PLI 1970). Such firms, however, may face a difficult future, because
pending legislation would prohibit them from executing many transactions in listed stocks for
accounts they manage. See text at notes 135-36 infra.
a Discretionary authority is normally obtained either through a power-of-attorney or a
deed of trust. Discretionary authority may be implied, however, where an investor slavishly
follows his adviser's recommendations. See SEC Advisory Comm. on Investment Manage-
ment Services for Individual Investors, Small Account Investment Management Services,
reprinted in CCH Fed. Sec. L. Repts. No. 465 pt. III at 19 (1973) jhereinafter cited as
Advisory Comm. Report].
See text at notes 116-121, infra.
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It is only recently that the phenomenon of broker-dealer entry
into discretionary management has received much attention from
the regulatory authorities. In the past, despite a long history of
broker-dealers offering such services, 4 discretionary management
accounted for -
 so small a portion of the business of broker-dealers
that the regulators contented themselves with sanctions against
fraud and trading abuses. The rapid entry of broker-dealers into
investment management, however, portends changes in the law on
grounds of increased need for investor protection. One can antici-
pate an attempt by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
through reliance on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 to up-
grade broker-sponsored or broker-promoted management services
by establishing standards of conduct and expanding broker-dealers'
duties to customers induced to enter some form of discretionary
management arrangement. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that
the broker's status as agent for customers placed in discretionary
management arrangements may encourage common-law courts to
apply long-standing, though generally neglected, fiduciary principles
in favor of dissatisfied claimants.° But even beyond these kinds of
developments, broker-dealer involvement in the provision of dis-
4
 While discretionary management services have been available for many years, see
Hearings on S. 3580 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
76th Cong., 3rd Sess., at 724-25 (1940), broker-dealers were not heavily involved in the
offering of such services when professional investment advisers first became an alternative to
trust companies and judicially appointed fiduciaries. See SEC, Report on Investment Trusts
and Investment Companies, Supp. Report on Investment Counsel, Investment Management,
Investment Supervisory, and Investment Advisory Services 11, 13 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
Investment Trust Study]. However, events of the 1960's have made attractive to broker-
dealers the prospect of supplementing cyclical brokerage income with substantial management
fees, commissions resulting from transactions on discretionary accounts, and the availability
of the portfolio of the accounts to facilitate . . . other business as a broker." Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Securities Industry
Study, S. Doc. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Study].
See also Subcomm. on Com. and Fin, of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com.,
Securities Industry Study H.R. No. 92-1519, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as
House Study].
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970).
6 Many state cases indicate that fiduciary principles are generally applicable to the
broker-customer relationship. See, e.g., Selcow v. Floersheimer, 20 App. Div. 2d 889, 248
N.Y.S.2d 934, 935 (1964). Some cases use trust terminology. E.g., Butcher v. Newburger,
318 Pa. 547, 551, 179 A. 240, 241 (1935). At least one major case has dealt specifically with
discretionary management. Birch v. Arnold & Sears, Inc., 288 Mass. 125, 192 N.E. 591
(1934). A recent case that sent shudders through the industry before it was settled was
Trustees of Hanover College v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., filed in the Southern
District of Indiana December 7, 1971. Even though the portfolio of the college had risen in
value, the college alleged that DLJ had selected unsuitable securities, "churned" with large
and frequent transactions in order to increase profits to the manager, and collected double
commissions or acted as principal for its own account, without disclosing the fact to the
college. See Belliveau, Discretion or Indiscretion, Institutional Investor, Aug. 1972, at 65;
Gillis & Weld, The Money Manager as Fiduciary, Fin. Analysts J., Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 10.
The latter article includes a history of the fiduciary responsibility of "money managers."
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cretionary management services has grave implications with regard
to the Securities Act of 1933, 7 the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 8
and the Investment Company Act of 1940. 9 And, as if that were not
enough, securities reform legislation pending in Congress is also
likely to affect broker-dealers involved in discretionary manage-
ment. 1 °
This article will set forth some of the immediate regulatory
problems now facing broker-dealers as a result of their discretionary
management activities, and will speculate on some of the less certain
possibilities broker-dealers may face. Thereafter, the article will
present the argument that the existing situation is far too unsettled,
and that if broker-dealers are to continue as competitive participants
in the marketing of discretionary management services, either Con-
gress or the SEC must develop a regulatory scheme far more coher-
ent than present prospects.
As the reader will note, many of the problems to be discussed
are not restricted to broker-dealers, but have regulatory implication
for other types of investment advisers offering discretionary man-
agement services. There are two purposes in focusing on broker-
dealers: (1) to avoid burdening the analysis with considerations
which, though important to other types of investment advisers, do
not add significantly to an understanding of how the fact of dis-
cretionary authority creates regulatory problems; and (2) because
broker-dealers, for reasons which will appear presently, are likely to
be the most immediate objects of the current official mood to regu-
late investment management services more restrictively.
I. DISCRETIONARY MANAGEMENT BY BROKER-DEALERS BEFORE
1974
A. Regulation of Discretionary Management
The sole federal regulation specifically pertaining to discretion-
ary management services by broker-dealers is Rule 15c1-7, 11 adopted
7 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1970).
8 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to -21 (1970).
9 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -51 (1970).
10 Two relevant bills that failed to be enacted last year were S. 470, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) [hereinafter cited as S. 470); H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. 5050]. In its amended form, S. 470 would have amended the securities laws to prohibit,
inter alma, most cases of combinations of the functions of broker-dealer and money-manager
by national exchange members after national exchanges begin to use negotiated commission
rates in all trades. For an analysis of the bill and its purposes, see S. Rep. No. 93-187, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For a discussion of this facet of both bills, see text at notes 130-39
infra. H.R. 5050 was reintroduced as H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), and the
provisions of S. 470 were included in a new bill, S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess, Both bills were
pending as this article went to press,
'' 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cI-7 (1974).
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pursuant to Section 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 12
Rule 15c1-7 is narrow in coverage, dealing only with churning and
record-keeping requirements." The Investment Advisers Act of
1940, which in certain respects is more stringent about the limits of
managers of discretionary accounts," expressly excludes from its
scope any broker-dealer whose advisory activities are
"solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer
and who receives no special compensation therefor." 15 To an extent,
state securities laws' 6 and the rules of the national securities ex-
changes" and the NASD" provide additional restrictions on the
management of discretionary accounts. But state and self-regulatory
controls have been credible threats against only the most blatant
misconduct. 19
 For the most part, regulation of discretionary man-
12
 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
12
 Rule 15c1-7 provides:
(a) The term 'manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contri-
vance", as used in Section 15(c) of the act, is hereby defined to include any act of any
broker or dealer designed to effect with or for any customer's account in respect to
which such broker or dealer . . . is vested with any discretionary power any
transactions of purchase or sale which are excessive in size or frequency in view of
the financial resources and character of such account.
(b) The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contri-
vance", as used in section 15(c)(1) of the act, is hereby defined to include any act of
any broker or dealer designed to effect with or for any customer's account in respect
to Which such broker or dealei . . . is vested with any discretionary power any
transaction of purchase or sale unless immediately after effecting such transaction
such broker or dealer makes a record of such transaction which record includes the
name of such customer, the name, amount and price of the security, and the date
and time when such transaction took place.
14 Section 206(3) of the Investment Advisers Act requires that an adviser acting as
principal for his own account both disclose "to such client in writing before the completion of
the transaction the capacity in which he is acting" and obtain the consent of the client to the
transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (1970). Rule 15c1-4 requires disclosure "at or before the
completion of each such transaction" but does not carry the additional requirement of prior
approval. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-4 (1974).
' 5
 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(011)(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (1970).
16
 Many state statutes dealing with fraud or the making of unreasonable predictions
seem applicable to the discretionary management area. See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. §§ 352,
352-c (McKinney 1968), Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110A, §§ 101-02 (Supp. 1974).
12
 NYSE Rules 95, 408; AMEX Rules 410, 421.
18
 NASD Rules of Fair Practice art, III, § 15, reprinted in CCH NASD Manual 11 2165,
at 2078 (1974).
' 9
 See, e.g., People v. Tellier, 7 Misc. 2d 43, 155 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1956), where a
partner of a brokerage firm was held in violation of New York law and enjoined from doing
business for five years for using false and misleading statements with respect to the viability of
a uranium mining company as a long term investment. Compare Tellier with Herdegen v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 31 Misc. 2d 104, 220 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1961), in
which the only New York statutes that might have applied to questionable advisory activities
were held inapplicable to cases involving a purchaser who "does not make his purchase from
the representer." Id. at 105, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 460. Accord, Jones Memorial Trust v. Tsai Inv.
Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), Under this reasoning, a broker-dealer
with discretionary powers would seem to be safe from prosecution under New York law if he
does not execute the orders himself.
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agement by broker-dealers has been left to the federal authorities,
and except for occasional mention in securities industry studies, 2 °
they have largely ignored the issue. Official interest has awaited the
recent growth of discretionary management in importance to the
brokerage industry.
B. The Entry of Broker
-Dealers into Discretionary Management
As anyone familiar with the recent history of the securities
markets is aware, the lucrative commission income characteristic of
the brokerage business in the 1960's has evaporated. The reciprocal
practices2 ' which added so much to the profitability of executing
securities transactions have given way first to volume discounts and
then to negotiated commissions. 22 Equally painful have been the
effects of the reduction in trading associated with the bear market of
the last several years. Commissions are down while fixed costs,
spurred by inflation, are high.
To survive the combination punch of effectively lower commis-
sion rates 23 and decreased trading volume, 24 a number of broker-
dealers have elected to turn to the provision of discretionary man-
agement services as an additional source of business. 25 Many houses
are creating their own affiliated management companies combining
with elements of equally hard-pressed research houses or trading on
2" See, e.g., SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc, No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 143-46, 152-53, 159-62 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special
Study].
2 ' See generally, The NYSE and the Commission Rate Struggle, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 1119,
1121-23 (1965).
22 See Note, 85 Harv, L. Rev. 794, 810-17 (1972).
23 Although commission rates have been raised several times since the introduction, first,
of volume discounts and later, negotiated commissions on large transactions, sec Note, 85
Harv, L. Rev. 794, 810-17 (1972), commission rates are, as a practical matter, substantially
lower. Negotiated rates have substantially reduced the return on commissions measured on a
per share basis. Moreover, the introduction of negotiated transactions on large trades is really
an entirely separate commission structure in which the rate is determined from trade to trade
instead of according to a predetermined schedule. In either view, it is plain that commission
rates have remained high only for the small investor. Even the small investor does not always
pay these higher rates. Some investment advisers, not affiliated with exchange members, will
bunch trades for their managed accounts in order to reach the negotiated commission plateau.
They then pass these savings on to their clients.
24 Trading volume figures, depressed as they are, also do not reflect accurately the
change of fortune for broker-dealers. Individual investors, who account for most of the excess
dollars in commission's now that negotiated commissions are in effect for large trades, have
been staying out of the market. See, e.g., Welles, The Little Man Returns Or So It Seems,
Institutional Investor, March 1972, at 34,
25 For accounts of some of the other steps brokerage firms have taken and will be taking
to improve profitability, see Bleakley, Where Will Wall Street's Profits Come From?, Institu-
tional Investor, Sept, 1972, at 33; Carmichael, The Securities Industry: An Audit of the
Public Firms, id. at 53.
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their brokerage capabilities to offer management services as well as
execution for the price of brokerage alone. 26
The successful marketing of advisory services can be of sub-
stantial benefit to a brokerage house in many ways. Plainly, advi-
sory fees are a source of additional income, at least to the extent that
they are not offset by the costs of managing discretionary accounts.
Furthermore, so long as broker-dealers are not prohibited entirely
from executing their accounts' trades through their own houses,
discretionary management can provide increased trading for the
brokerage side of the house. 27 In addition to an increase in the
number of trades, and so long as some form of non-negotiated
commission arrangement is permitted," broker-dealers can still
realize the benefits of large trades made in the fixed-rate era by
grouping many small trades into a single large trade. 29 And finally,
even those houses not offering discretionary management themselves
or through affiliates can profit by fees received for referring accounts
to those who do provide discretionary management and by acting as
custodian and executing brokers for the accounts they refer. 3 °
25
 See text at notes 116-21 infra.
27
 There are limits to the income a broker-dealer can realize from executions for his
managed accounts, however. SEC Rule 19b-2 requires exchanges to have as the "principal
purpose" of their members' affiliation "the conduct of a public securities business," and
non-public transactions are limited to a certain percentage of all trades. 17 C.F.R.
240.19b-2 (1974). The rule has been criticized as inadequate by the congressional subcom-
mittees investigating the need for securities industry reforms. See Senate Study, supra note 4,
at 80-85; House Study, supra note 4, at 149-54. H.R. 5050 and S. 470, supra note 10, would
prohibit the providing of brokerage for managed institutional accounts in transactions on an
exchange. See text at notes 135-36 infra.
28
 Even when fully negotiated rates come into being, it will not follow that commissions
will be negotiated for every trade. Many trades will be so small that the cost of negotiation
would exceed the return from commissions. It is too early to tell whether the industry will fall
into some form of parallel pricing, but it is certain that commission rates for these smaller
trades will be posted rates rather than negotiated rates. Insofar as the investor subject to
posted rates is concerned, the new arrangements will be little different from the arrangements
during the fixed-rate regime. To the extent that price competition reduces commissions,
investors will benefit. However, the rate itself will still have been imposed outside the
transaction. More important, a posted rate system raises questions of fiduciary duty with
regard to best execution. Broker-dealers managing discretionary accounts for individuals
apparently are not going to be prohibited from executing for their managed accounts, and
some houses may elect their own posted rates to subsidize their management services. See note
115, infra.
29
 See, e.g., NYSE Const. art. XV, §§ 1, 8 (the NYSE "anti-rebate" rule). By virtue of
anti-rebate rules, broker-dealers can save considerable internal and other expenses by ac-
complishing in a reduced number of large trades the same result that would come from the
effecting of many smaller ones, and at the same time charging commissions based on the
theoretically smaller trades.
1° Referrals are largely a phenomenon associated with the provision of discretionary
management services to small investors. See Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 39-40.
In the last two or three years, the SEC has received a number of inquiries about the legality of
arrangements between broker-dealers and investment advisers. See, e.g., John C. Tead, Co.,
• 2 CCH Mutual Funds Guide ¶ 9896, at 12559 (1973). For a discussion of some of the
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II. REGULATORY PROSPECTS FOR DISCRETIONARY MANAGEMENT
A. Securities Act of 1933
It is possible that discretionary accounts will be regarded as
securities, that broker-dealer managers of such accounts will be
regarded as issuers of those securities, 31 and that broker-dealers
referring such accounts to other discretionary managers will be
regarded as statutory underwriters. 32 If that is so, then broker-
dealers will be required to register each account being managed on a
discretionary basis and every account being referred for discretion-
ary management, or to rely on some exception or exclusion from, or
safe harbor in, the Securities Act of 1933.
The route to security status for discretionary accounts is com-
plex, but there is good reason to believe that it has been traveled
almost to its destination. The starting point is SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co. 33 In that case, the Supreme Court set out a three-pronged test
for defining the term "investment contract" as that term is used in
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act, the section which defines "secu-
rity" for statutory purposes." An arrangement is deemed a statutory
security if it involves: (1) a contract for investing money; (2) with
profits expected solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third
party; and (3) a common enterprise."
Although there were indications both before and after Howey
was decided that a discretionary account might be an investment
contract and hence a security, 36 a strict application of the element of
implications under the federal securities laws of referral fee arrangements, sec text at notes
116-30, infra.
31 A statutory issuer includes "every person who issues or proposes to issue any security."
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1970).
32 A statutory underwriter is "any person who . • . offers or sells for an issuer in
connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or
indirect underwriting of any such undertaking . . .." Securities Act of 1933 §2(11.), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(11) (1970).
33 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
34 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
35 328 U.S. at 298-99.
36 E.g., SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935), where the court stated:
Whether one invests money in the proverbial gold mine • • . or invests in a
speculative venture by reason or the claimed skill and experience of a grain and
stock market manipulator to make profits, the transactions cannot be rationally
distinguished in determining the dealings which Congress intended to regulate in
using the term "investment contract." Both are investments . . . . Both entail the
issuance of a security. In one the investor expects profits by reason of the gold to be
mined; in the other, by reason of the skill and experience of the defendant in the
market. In both, the opportunities for fraud are notorious.
Id. at 248-49. Follwing Howey, a number of cases came to the same conclusion. E.g.,
Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (court stated that
in the contrary line of cases the reading of the !limey formulation is too narrow); Johnson v,
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the Howey test specifying the need for a common enterprise would
seem to exclude discretionary accounts unless a number of them
were being managed in common fashion. That seems to be the
position the Commission and the courts had been taking as au-
thoritative until very recently. 37 In fact, only three years ago, in
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, bic., 38 the Seventh Circuit rejected
the argument that a discretionary account for trading in commodity
futures is a security, on the ground that investors in these accounts
"were not joint participants in the same investment enterprise." 39
But despite its earlier reluctance, the SEC seems now to be-
lieve, contrary to the Seventh Circuit, that strict commonality in the
management of discretionary accounts is not required to create an
investment contract. Although the Commission's first forays against
unregistered discretionary accounts emphasized the commonality
concept, 4 ° more recently, the Commission persuaded the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,'" to hold that a
discretionary commodity futures account is a security. 42 The
rationale seems to be that the reliance each investor places in the
manager's acumen is a common element of the discretionary ac-
counts sufficient to satisfy Howey. 43 Strained as this logic is," it
Espey, [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 93,376, at 91927 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D,N.Y. 1968); Maheu v.
Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf. Commercial Iron & Metal Co.
v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39, 42 (10th Cir. 1973); Booth v. Peavey Co, Commodity Servs.,
430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970).
37
 Despite the well-known existence of discretionary management services, the SEC has
apparently never taken action, either through enforcement or through its rule-making author-
ity, to have discretionary accounts registered absent a common investment scheme. As
recently as 1970, the Commission attacked a discretionarraccount arrangement as a security
on grounds, among others, that investment decisions were being applied to all accounts on a
uniform basis, but not simply on grounds that the accounts were being managed on a
discretionary basis. See SEC Litigation Release No. 4534 (Feb. 5, 1970), discussed in text at
note 60 infra.
38 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
39 457 F.2d at 277.
4° See SEC Litigation Release No. 4534 (Feb, 5, 1970), discussed in text at note 60 infra.
41
 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974). Accord, Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F.
Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), affcl without opinion, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 994 (1974).
42 497 F.2d at .522.
43
 The court discusses this principle at some length. Id. at 520-23. "[T]he critical inquiry
is confined to whether the fortuity of the investments collectively is essentially dependent upon
promoter expertise." Id. at 522. Guidance is "uniformly extended to all . . . investors," i.e. the
same general sort of services are rendered, and "the success of the trading enterprise as a
whole and customer investments individually is contingent upon the sagacious investment
counseling of Continental Commodities." Id. at 522-23. Support for this expansive interpreta-
tion of the Howey "common enterprise" requirement comes from an emphasis upon the
potential effect of the actions of the promoter and from focusing less on the "commonality" of
the services actually provided than the type of services which the promoter contracts to
provide. Otherwise, a formidable problem in analysii would arise from the fact that even
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captures an idea attaining increasing support among commen-
tators—that an arrangement or promotion should be regarded as a
statutory investment contract whenever the assets at risk in an
investment arrangement belong substantially to one party and the
realization of a return depends primarily on the efforts of the promo-
ter or manager. 45
This program to expand the definition of investment contract
can be understood from several perspectives. From the point of
view of dissatisfied investors, the Securities Act of 1933 provides a
neat remedy for recovering the value of their accounts without any
need to show fraud by the manager. All that is required is a showing
of non-registration. 46 Moreover, the other federal securities laws, in
particular the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, have a highly
underdeveloped regulatory posture regarding discretionary man-
agement services. Recoveries are thus less certain, and litigation is
though the promoter extends a certain type of service to all investors, he does not perform
exactly the same service and therefore does not produce identical results in every case.
44 It should be emphasized that the discretionary accounts described in Continental
Commodities can be distinguished from normal discretionary accounts, and that Continental
Commodities can thus be limited on its facts. In most discretionary accounts, the investor
owns the assets purchased for his account and the risk of loss is directly attributable to the
wisdom of the investment decision. Continental Commodities, however, involved a firm
placing its clients into naked options written by the firm. 497 F.2d at 518. Thus the investor's
return depended on two factors:—(1) the wisdom of the investment decision; and (2) the
ability of the firm to pay for the claims of its clients for successful options purchases. Once one
recognizes the importance of the second element to the result, one can see that Continental
Commodities is not quite the departure from llowey it appears to be because all the investors
in Continental Commodities had in common an unstated but very real investment in the
financial health of the firm. Nonetheless, even though the court seemed to appreciate the dual
characteristic of the discretionary accounts at issue, it did not emphasize the common
investment in the firm as a basis for concluding the accounts were securities.
41
 See Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining
Federal Securities, 25 Hastings L.J. 219 (1974), where after a discussion of the history of the
definition of securities, it is stated that "Mlle problem with the limey formula is not that it is
wrong, but that it is often applied restrictively and without recognizing that it is merely a
statement of a result based upon the facts in the Homey case." Id. at 236. Emphasizing the
importance of the location of the risk of loss and the control of the return on investment,
Hannon & Thomas design a framework of seven questions to be answered in formulating a
definition of a statutory security, and the article discusses the application of their analysis to
various categories of enterprises and promotions that are currently the sources of controversy
with respect to whether participations in them are statutory securities, For another example of
current attitudes, see Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream
of Securities Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135 (1971), in which the author describes the
current law as "the result of a crazy-quilt development where the courts tended to follow the
language of prior decisions without giving thought to the purpose behind the various securities
acts . . . ." Id. at 139. It is suggested that a security should be defined as "the investment of
money or money's worth in the risk capital of a venture with the expectation of some benefit
to the investor where the investor has no direct control over the investment or policy decisions
of the venture." Id. at 174 (emphasis deleted). This article is in part an attempt to,improve
upon another treatment in Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security:" Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 467 (1967).
46
 Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. 	 771 (1970).
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likely to be more complex. But as Continental Commodities dem-
onstrates, even if the remedies provided by other federal securities
laws were more certain, there may be no subject matter jurisdiction
under them unless the underlying agreement is determined to be a
security in the first place.'"
Thus, failure to register discretionary accounts could place
broker-dealers in serious jeopardy. In essence, every client owning
an unregistered account would have a "put"48 against his manager
in the amount of his initial investment, regardless of how skillfully
his investment program was run. 49 Furthermore, because of the
structure of the Securities Act, there is little basis for obtaining
substantial relief from registration by means of exemptions, exclu-
sions and safe-harbor rules. By its terms, the statute gives the
Commission very little discretion to permit registration to be by-
passed.
The best routes for avoiding registration would seem to be: the
intrastate exemption, section 3(a)(11);5° the small-offering exemp-
tion, section 3(b);" and the private offering exemption, section
4(2). 52
 But few houses would find the intrastate exemption attractive
because of the severe limit on obtaining clients that this would
entail. Moreover, many of the houses now expanding into money
management activities already operate in more than one state. The
small-offering exemption also is of limited utility since compliance
with the statutory ceiling of $500,000 virtually eliminates all institu-
tional accounts. Even if a house were willing to restrict its discre-
tionary management activities to accounts of $500,000 or less," it is
42 All of the relevant requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 apply by their terms only to transactions in or involving
securities. See, e.g., the antifraud provisions of Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) which apply
to the use of deception "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
49
 Literally, a "put" is a contract which grants the holder the option to sell to the maker,
at any time within a given period and at a fixed price, a certain number of shares of a stock.
Puts are used by holders of stock for hedging for the duration of the contract, although they
may be purchased at any time. G. Munn, Encyclopedia of Banking & Finance 767 (7th ed. F.
Garcia rev. 1973).
49
 See text at note 46, supra.
5°
 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970).
51
 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970).
52 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
53 Section 3(b) provides:
The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations, and
subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class of
securities to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the
enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the
public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount
involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of securities
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not at all clear .
 that registration would not still be required. The
Commission might well conclude that each separate account belongs
to a set of securities so related in character that in effect the
accounts should be integrated—that is, combined in value—to
determine the size of the offering." The practical effect of applying
the integration doctrine, of course, would be to put broker-dealers to
the choice of registering each account or foregoing their plans to
offer discretionary management services. Finally, the private offer-
ing exemption seems an equally doubtful way out of registration. To
the extent houses rely on advertising to attract clients, they will be
engaging in a public offering." Furthermore, even if the advertising
problem could be solved, the integration doctrine would likely again
come into play and keep the number of offerees so low as to
eliminate discretionary management without registration. 56
It may happen, of course, that the Supreme Court or Congress
will reject the Fifth Circuit's extension of Howey and insist on
greater commonality than shared management. 57
 But actually, the
commonality issue is far more complex than would appear from
Illilnarik and Continental Commodities. Although the discussion
above assumed that discretionary accounts under one house's man-
agement have little in common outside the advisory services they
receive, a more realistic assumption would recognize that each ac-
count will overlap many others in portfolio composition and mix.
The reasons for such overlap follow from the management approach
shall be exempted under this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such
issue is offered to the public exceeds $500,000.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(6) (1970).
54
 Under the most common application of the doctrine of integration, a number of
ostensibly private offerings, which are ordinarily exempt from registration under Securities
Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), may be considered components of a single public
offering in violation of the registration requirements. The integration theory has been applied
to other exemptions, although it has been restricted to exemptions based on the type of
offering or sale involved rather than upon the sort of securities issued. For a discussion of the
doctrine, see Shapiro & Sachs, Integration under the Securities Act: "Once An Exemption,
Not Always . . .", 31 Md, L. Rev. 3 (1971).
55
 See SEC Rule 146, Transactions By An Issuer Deemed Not To Involve Any Public
Offering, adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487, reprinted in 1 CCH Fed, Sec. L.
Rep. ¶ 2710, at 2907-12 (Apr. 23, 1974). Reasons for the new changes appear in the release in
which it was proposed. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336, reprinted in [1972-73 Transfer
Binderl CCH Fed. Sec. L, Rep. 79, 108, at 82395 (Nov. 28, 1972).
56 See note 54 supra.
57
 There is no evidence that either is interested in doing so. Congress is currently
considering major federal securities law reform without any apparent interest in questioning
the jurisdictional reach of the Securities Act of 1933. See, e.g., H. R. 5050, supra note 10. The
Supreme Court has had two recent opportunities to consider the breath of the definition of
security in the Securities Act. It has declined to review each. See Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of
Trade, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974); SEC v. Glenn Turner
Enterps., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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taken by most advisers. Managers do not seek out investment op-
portunities58
 account by account as an individual might do with his
own portfolio. For purposes of efficiency, managers evaluate in-
vestment opportunities first, and where action is indicated, identify
all accounts suitable for the proposed action. 59
 Although not every
suitable account would be affected, it is plain that the correspon-
dence in activity among accounts with similar objectives would be
high. Moreover, the correspondence tends to increase over time
because managers follow only a limited selection of investment
opportunities rather than the entire investment universe. If it were
otherwise, it would be virtually impossible, even with computeriza-
tion, to provide clients with professional management services. Con-
sider, for example, what would be involved in following, with
sufficient depth to reach an informed investment decision, all the
listed common stocks, let alone all publicly traded common stocks,
debt instruments, private placements, and tax shelters—to list the
investments typical of managed accounts.
Certainly, if the Commission is prepared to insist that dis-
cretionary accounts, without more, are investment contracts, corn-
" The term "investment opportunities" is used here to include much more than oppor-
tunities to buy securities. The responsibilities of an investment adviser include decisions about
buying, selling, holding, hedging, trading, choice of markets, technical conditions for invest-
ing, portfolio mix, tax consequences and so forth. Each decision is an investment decision and
subject to the adviser's duty of professional care.
59 The "suitability doctrine" is essentially a requirement that broker-dealers sell or
recommend only securities that are suited to the particular investment needs of the individual
customer. The doctrine arose in response to the high-pressure "boiler room" sales technique,
which was designed to influence prospective investors to make on-the-spot decisions to buy
instead of considering the advisability of the suggested purchases. 6 L. Loss, Securities
Regulation 3708-09 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). Various self-regulatory measures are designed to
eliminate the problem. E.g., NYSE Rule 405 (The so-called "know your customer rule");
NASD Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 2, reprinted in CCH NASD Manual 11 2152, at 2051
(1974) which provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security,
a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such
customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
Among the practices listed by the NASD Board of Governors in 1964 as a clear violation of
section 2 is:
1. Recommending speculative low-priced securities to customers without knowledge
of or attempt to obtain information concerning the customers' other securities hold-
ings, their financial situation and other necessary data. The principle here is that this
practice, by its very nature, involves a high probability that the recommendation
will not be suitable for at least some of the persons solicited.. . .
Id. This interpretation arose in Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133 (1960), and is not limited
in its application to the classic "boiler room." Id. at 137-38.
The SEC's suitability rule for broker-dealers who are not members of national exchanges
or the NASD is Rule 15b10-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1974), with reinforcing record-
keeping requirements in Rule 15b10-6(a)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-6(a)(1)(ii) (1974). Com-
mentators have discussed the requirements at length. E.g., L. Loss, supra, at 3708-28; Muncl-
heim, Professional Responsibitites of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 Duke
L. J. 445.
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monality of portfolio will only reinforce the Commission's position.
Indeed, the investment community is already alerted to the grave
implications of providing overlapping advisory services. Several
years ago, First National City Bank and Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner and Smith, Inc., jointly offered a discretionary-management
program. The plan provided that investors were to be placed into
one of two portfolios depending on whether the objective was in-
come or growth. In a 1970 lawsuit the Commission took the position
that the similarity of portfolios rendered each separate account a
security. 60 Although the case eventually was settled, the Commis-
sion has not varied from its position. On the contrary, its view has
become more expansive by focusing on substantial overlap rather
than insisting on virtual identity of accounts. 61 The only ameliora-
tive step traceable to the Commission appears in the Report of the
Advisory Committee on Investment Management Services for Indi-
vidual Investors. 62
 The Committee concluded that, despite portfolio
overlap, management highly tailored to the individual needs of an
investor should be regarded as a private offering. 63 While this
question of individualized services has not yet been resolved, pres-
ent indications are that the Committee's recommendation will be
rejected."
B. The Investment Company Act of 1940
The ripples from the First National City Bank case go beyond
the Securities Act. In the complaint filed by the SEC appears the
contention that Citibank was operating an unregistered investment
company in addition to offering unregistered securities for sale. The
argument is somewhat technical, but it follows logically from the
statute. An investment company is defined in section 3(a) as "any
6°
 See SEC Litigation Release No. 4534 (Feb. 6, 1970).
1" The SEC stated in Finanswer America/Investments, Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Hinder]
CCU Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,111, at 80405 (1971):
Registration of such an arrangement under the Investment Company Act would be
necessary where substantially the same, or substantially overlapping, advice is
rendered to each account or to a discernible group or groups of accounts, and
where such accounts engage in the same securities transactions. Also, the interests
offered in such an arrangement (the accounts) may be securities required to be
registered ..
Id. at 80406.
62
 Advisory Comm, Report, supra note 2.
63
 Id. at 23-25, The Committee's position will be difficult to sustain, in light of Rule 146.
Supra note 56.
64
 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5491, reprinted in [1973-74 Transfer Binder) Cal
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79, 767 at 84070 (Apr. 30, 1974). This release requested public
comment on the role of the Commission in dealing with bank-sponsored investment services.
According to the release, discretionary accounts managed for individual investors may be
regarded as securities. No mention appears of any effect individualized services might have on
the status of a discretionary account as a security.
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issuer which.—(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily .. .
in the business of investing . . . in securities." 65
 An issuer is any
"person who issues ... any security."" Included in the definition of
person is "a company," 67 and a company includes "any organized
group of persons whether incorporated or not." 68 Under this
analysis, a set of discretionary accounts might be regarded as an
organized group. Since the definition of security in both the Se-
curities Act and the Investment Company Act is the same, such a
group would be issuing investment contracts to each account owner.
Thus, the group would fit the "any issuer" language of section 3(a).
Finally, because the purpose of creating such account was to invest
in the securities markets, the group of accounts would be an issuer
engaged in investing in securities. 69
This technical argument is not without policy support since
most of the dangers recited in section 1(b) of the Investment Com-
pany Act" which purport to justify its existence are present to a
large degree when many individual dikretionary accounts are under
the control of one manager. 7 ' Moreover, owners of discretionary
6" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1970).
55 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(22) (1970), which provides in full that an issuer is "every person
who issues or proposes to issue any security, or has outstanding any security which it has
issued."
67 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(28) (1970), which defines "person" to include "a natural person or
a company."
6" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8) (1970), which provides:
"Company" means a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock
corporation, a trust, a fund, or any organized group of persons whether incorporated
or not; or any receiver, trustee in bankruptcy or similar official or any liquidating
agent for any of the foregoing, in his capacity as such.
69 It is not necessary that the portfolio of each discretionary client consist exclusively of
securities. In addition to the "engaged primarily" language of § 3(a)(1), § 3(a)(3) provides a
numerical test. It includes any issuer which: "is engaged or proposed to engage in the business
of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities and owns or proposes to
acquire investment securities, having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such
issuer's total assets ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1970). In fact, there is a good argument that
§ 3(a)(3) would provide the jurisdictional basis for regulating discretionary management under
the Investment Company Act. Since there would have been no intent to form a statutory
investment company, a set of discretionary accounts, if subject to the Act, would be an
"inadvertent" investment company. It has been argued that § 3(a)(3) was intended to be the
jurisdictional basis for reaching inadvertent investment companies. Kerr, The Inadvertent
Investment Company, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1960). But see SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines,
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
" 15 U.S.C.	 80a-1(b) (1970).
71 Like individual investors in investment companies, purchasers of discretionary man-
agement services may find that their portfolios contain over-valued securities, that their
accounts have been subject to unsafe leveraging, and that their accounts have experienced
questionable trading practices. As a class, individual investors are not as sophisticated about
investment matters as are financial advisers to institutions such as pensions and endowments,
and they do not possess the requisite financial expertise to monitor the activities of their
investment advisers. See generally Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2. To protect inves-
tors in investment companies from the excesses of their managers, the Investment Company
Act imposes severe restrictions on the investment discretion of management. The Act requires
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accounts are without even the minimal protection provided regis-
tered investment companies by outside directors. But it is plain that
for all practical purposes, application of the Investment Company
Act to discretionary accounts would end the service unless a large
number of exemptions could be obtained. The SEC's Advisory
Committee on Investment Management Services recognized the
seriousness of this problem and recommended that discretionary
accounts not be subjected to the Investment Company Act unless
the securities nominally owned by clients were being pooled. The
Committee's argument was that individual ownership of the se-
curities in an account is so unlike. the status of shareholders of
traditional investment companies as to be eligible for escape from
application of the statute. 72
That argument, although it has its appeal, is unlikely to pre-
vail. The distinction between pooled' and non-pooled accounts finds
no support in the statute unless the meaning of "organized group""
is to turn on whether the securities belonging to discretionary ac-
adoption of a highly structured organizational form. See Investment Company Act §§ 14-16,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-14 to -16 (1970). The capital structure is controlled. See Investment Company
Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1970). There are various record keeping and reporting
requirements. See Investment Company Act §§ 29-33, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 to -33 (1970). In
addition, certain transactions with affiliates are prohibited absent approval of the SEC. See
Investment Company Act §§ 17(a), (b). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a), (b) (1970).
72
 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 22-25. Consider, for comparison, the
regulatory problems associated with variable life insurance (VIA). Benefits under VLI are not
fixed but are determined according to the asset value of a portfolio of securities. Although the
insurance industry claimed that VLI was an insurance contract and hence should not be
subject to regulation under the federal securities laws, the SEC insisted that VLI was a
security and that the policyholders were investors in an investment company. Based on the
SEC's previous successes in obtaining jurisdiction under the Securities and Investment Com-
pany Acts over the sale of variable annuities, see SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359
U.S. 65 (1959); Prudential Ins, Co. v. SEC, 327 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 953 (1964), the industry capitulated. Instead it sought exemptive relief from various
provisions in the federal securities laws, and especially from the Investment Company Act.
After an extensive investigation, the Commission issued Investment Company Act Rule 3c-4,
17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-4 (1974), and Investment Advisers Act Rule 202 -1, 17 § 275.202-1
(1974), which exempted VIA totally from regulation under the two statutes. See SEC Invest-
ment Corimany Act Release No. 7644 reprinted in [1972-73 Transfer Binder[ CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 11 79,201 at 82654 (Jan. 31, 1973). Although the life insurance industry was poised for
issuance of its new insurance vehicle, the response of many interest groups whose competitive
position would be adversely affected by total exemption was outrage. Acting quickly, the SEC
published proposed amendments to Rule 3c-4 and Rule 202-1, conditioning the exemptions
available in those rules to a Commission determination that state insurance regulation pro-
vided VLI purchasers with protection comparable to that available under the Investment
Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act. See SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 8000 reprinted in [1973 Transfer Binder] CC H Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,518 at 83410 (Sept.
20, 1973). Since most states do not provide comparable protections, and since most state
insurance commissioners were not willing to have the SEC involved in the regulation of
insurance sold to their jurisdictions, VIA is not yet being actively marketed. See generally
Blank, Keen, Payne, & Miller, Variable Life Insurance and the Federal Securities Laws, 60
Va. L. Rev. 71 (1974).
73
 See text at notes 65-68, supra.
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counts are kept segregated from each other. Such an interpretation,
however, would be sharply inconsistent with the commonality ar-
gument that designates discretionary accounts as investment con-
tracts and hence statutory securities. The Commission would be
hard-pressed to explain how a group of discretionary accounts are
sufficiently related to be securities and at the same time sufficiently
unrelated not to be members of an organized group. Furthermore,
the pooling/non-pooling distinction makes little policy sense since
the likelihood of the abuses which led to the passage of the Invest-
ment Company Act do not seem less likely simply because accounts
are not pooled. 74
The only reasonable way out of Investment Company Act
regulation, barring a large-scale discretionary exemption under sec-
tion 6(c), 75
 is through use of the same argument raised by the
Advisory Committee against Securities Act regulation. If sufficient
individualization can be achieved to transpose a group of discretion-
ary accounts from characterization as investment contracts to clas-
sification as agency relationships, regulation under both statutes can
be avoided. 76 Investors will not be acting in common, nor will they
be an organized group. But again, indications are that individuali-
zation of investment services is not a touchstone the Commission
will sanction, and application of the Investment Company Act to
the management of discretionary accounts remains highly possible. 77
C. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
Still another set of regulatory problems for broker-dealers man-
aging discretionary accounts lies in wait in the Investment Advisers
Act." Originally designed as little more than a census-type licensing
statute, 79 the Advisers Act promises to become a powerful regula-
74 For example, an investment adviser willing to place an overvalued underwriting into
his client's accounts will find it no more difficult to do so for a number of accounts maintained
separately than he would for the same number of accounts having portfolios maintained in
common. To take another example, an investment adviser anxious to stimulate referrals by
broker-dealers might turn his clients' portfolios over more rapidly than otherwise. Again, it
makes little difference whether custody of each account is maintained separately or in
common.
73 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1970).
74
 See Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 16-26. Actually, the Advisory Commit-
tee does not contend that the Investment Company Act and the Securities Act cannot be
interpreted to apply to the management of discretionary accounts. Rather, the Advisory
Committee's argument is that, as a policy matter, it would be both unnecessary and unfortu-
nate to apply those statutes if investment advisers were providing their clients with
sufficiently individualized management. Id. at 26.
77 See note 64 supra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 80b-I to -21 (1970).
74
 In 1940, David Schenker, the Chief Counsel of the SEC Investment Trust Study,
described the purposes of Title II in the following terms:
Now, I cannot impress too strongly upon the Senators the fact that our title 2
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tory tool for controlling the advisory activities of the professional
money management community. The last decade has seen the Su-
preme Court breathe life into the antifraud provision of the statute
by extending its scope beyond narrow common-law definitions;" it
has seen Congress expand the statutory jurisdiction of the SEC to
regulate and restrict investment management practices;" and it has
seen the SEC vastly increase its regulatory activities in administer-
ing the Act. 82
 Furthermore, the troubled condition of the securities
industry is certain to reinforce congressional sentiment for creating
additional regulatory controls over money management, and the
most likely vehicle for legislative action is amendment of the Advis-
ers Act. 83
does not attempt to say who can be an investment counselor, and does not even
remotely presume to undertake to pass upon their qualifications. All we say is that in
order to get some idea of who is in this business and what is his background, you
cannot use the mails to perform your investment counsel business unless you are
registered with us.
Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 50 (1940). It should be noted, however, that the title also
contains antifraud and other prohibitory provisions directed at practices of advisers. E.g.
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970). These received some
attention in debate: "The bill makes fraudulent practices by investment advisers unlawful and
requires investment advisers ... to register with the Commission which is empowered to deny
registration to individuals convicted ... for securities frauds." 86 Cong. Rec. 9809 (remarks
of Rep. Cole). Despite the presence of these sections, the statute has been administered largely
as a registration measure, in contrast to the manner in which the similar provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have been applied against broker-dealers.
8°
 In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the Supreme
Court held that * 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970),
empowered the SEC to seek an injunction to compel an investment adviser to disclose the fact
that he was engaging in the practice of "scalping," that is, purchasing shares of a particular
security for his own account prior to making a recommendation of the same security to his
clients and then selling at a profit as a result of the increase in price caused by circulation of
the recommendations. In disapproving a technical construction of the statute, the Court
discussed legislative history at length and concluded that the Act manifests "a congressional
intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an
investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to render advice which was not disin-
terested," 375 U.S. at 191-92, and "to substitute a philosophy of disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor." Id. at 198.
" Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act were passed in 1970 as a portion of
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970. 15 L.S.C. § 80b-3(d) (1970), amending 15
U.S.C. § 806-3 (1964). These amendments extended the prohibitions 'of the Act to practices
not involving the use of the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Other relevant
amendments were accomplished in 1960. See, e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (1970), amending 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1958) (adding to prohibited practices any act, practice, or course of business
which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" and directed the SEC to "define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts, practices, and courses of business
ea
 As a good indicator of the increase in regulatory activity, 181 Investment Advisers Act
releases were issued during the period 1940-1964, while 241 additional releases were issued by
the end of June, 1974. Observers fully expect SEC involvement not only to continue, but also
to accelerate. See, e.g., Gillis, Securities Law and Regulation: Regulation of Analysts, Fin.
Analysts J,, Jan.-Feb. 1974, at 14, 94.
83 Congressman Moss, whose subcommittee produced H.R. 5050 after lengthy hearings,
363
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Some flavor of the developments the advisory community can
anticipate in connection with the Advisers Act is already evident.
Fee splitting will probably be limited, if indeed it is not elimi-
nated. 84
 Financial responsibility rules will be adopted." Conflicts of
interest will become subject to increasing regulatory control." More
direct. services to clients will be required. 87 Less immediate, but
see Hearings before a Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. an Interstate and
Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives, 92d Cong., 1st-2d Sess. (1971-72), and a
study of many problems of the securities industry, see House Study, supra note 4, has already
indicated that his next project will be an inquiry into the need for legislative changes in the
Investment Advisers Act. See Wall Street Letter, Sept. 16, 1974, at 7, col. 1.
84
 Data collected in the institutional investor study confirm the importance of referrals
from broker-dealers to investment advisers. See Institutional Investor Study, supra note I, at
196-206. Undisclosed referrals fees are plainly unlawful. See John C. Tead, Co., CCH Mutual
Funds Guide 9896, at 12559 (1973). In addition to the application of the federal securities
laws to undisclosed referral fees, common-law fiduciary principles prohibit the promotion of
relationships based on trust and confidence for undisclosed fees. See Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 394, at 219 (1957). The question is whether fully disclosed referral fees of any type
are to be permitted. See text at notes 116-30 infra,
88
 The Advisory Committee on Investment Management Services for Individual Inves-
tors strongly recommended minimum financial responsibility rules. See Advisory Comm.
Report, supra note 2, at 64-66. During the recent legislative investigations into the securities
industry in the House and in the Senate, a great deal of effort was expended on the question
of financial responsibility requirements for broker-dealers. See House Study, supra note 4,
chs. I1I-VI; Senate Study, supra note 4, at 23-42. Having recommended more stringent
responsibility rules for broker-dealers similar congressional treatment of investment advisers
cannot be far behind.
86
 Conflicts of interest are said to be "endemic to the securities business." House Study,
supra note 4, at 149. The new regulatory mood, however, is not to abide the existence of
conflicts of interest, whether perceived or real. See Senate Study, supra note 4, at 75-77.
Whereas in the past, investment advisers were left to resolve conflicts of interest in the best
fashion they could, the current sentiment seems to be to identify particular conflict-of-interest
situations and to prescribe the conduct for the adviser to follow. The combination of broker-
age and money management in a fixed-commission regime presents numerous opportunities
for a broker-dealer manager to serve his own interests at the expense of those of his clients.
See Welles, Should Money Management and Brokerage be Separated?, Institutional Investor,
June 1971, at 21. Although the conflicts inherent in such arrangements have been tolerated for
years, Congress is now prepared to deal with them by prohibiting broker-dealer managers
from executing transactions on all securities exchanges for managed accounts. See text at
notes 131-43 infra. Another conflict-of-interest previously ignored is the use of brokerage
commissions to pay for research. The conflict arises because the manager is supposed to be
earning part of his fee on the basis of his own research ability. Vet, it is obviously useful for a
manager to be able to supplement his own research with that of a leading brokerage house.
Proposed legislation would permit such extra-payment commissions if the manager satisfies
certain statutory conditions. Senate Bill, supra note 10. One other example, pertaining to
investment companies, is also instructive. Common-law fiduciary principles prohibit the sale
of a fiduciary office lest the fiduciary's interest in his own profit influence his choice of a
successor. Consonant with those principles, the case of Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d
Cir. 1971), held that the transfer for consideration of the office of investment adviser to an
investment company was unlawful. Id, at 1342. The Senate bill sets conditions permitting
such transfer on a basis, presumably, which gives the outgoing adviser adequate compensa-
tion for entreprenurial risk without subjecting the investment company to the danger of being
left with an inferior successor.
87 As the First National City Bank case demonstrates, see text at note 60, supra,
investment advisers must do more than treat all investors with comparable goals alike, See
364
REGULATING DISCRETIONARY MANAGEME,N7'
almost as certain, entry into the profession will be restricted through
the use of examinations and codes of conduct's Even advisory fees
are unlikely to escape official scrutiny. 89
Of course, there is nothing distinctively harsh about the treat-
ment broker-dealers can expect from administration of the Advisers
Act simply by virtue of their status as broker-dealers. All statutory
investment advisers managing discretionary accounts will face es-
sentially the same regulatory restrictions on their advisory activities
whatever their organizational character. What will come as a sur-
prise to many broker-dealers is that the Advisers Act applies to them
at all, since section 202(a)(11) 9° of the Act appears to exclude them
from the definition of statutory investment adviser. Section
202(a)(11) reads:
text at note 61 supra. There has long been an emphasis on the close personal relationship
between a client and an investment manager as denoting a special type of investment
management deserving of special regulatory recognition. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3580 before
a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., at 743-54 (1940);
Hearings on H.R. 10065 before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., at 86-91 (1940).
es
 A goal of the SEC is tight regulation of entry into the field, including "minimum
qualification requirements and minimum financial requirements." Securities Week, Sept. 3,
1973, at 8. One member of the SEC noted the importance of such requirements, the lack of
experience of many investment advisers, and the anomalous situation that arises when
broker-dealers who merely execute orders must pass qualifying examinations while advisers,
upon whom customers place direct reliance, need not. Hedberg, Let's Regulate Investment
Advice, Fin. Analysts J., May-June 1973, at 24; Owens, Investment Adviser Regulation, Fin.
Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 12-14. Accord, Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 63;
Nelson, Let's Make Investment Advisers Accountable, Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1973, at
19. In addition, some states have already taken action, and others plan to do so. Oklahoma
Securities Commission has issued a rule requiring that investment advisers pass the standard
broker-dealer examination. Rule R-204(b)(6) reprinted in 2 CCH Blue Sky Law Rep. Ill 39604
at 35505 (1970). Recently, in New York, there has been a strong legislative movement toward
certification of securities analysts. Securities Week, Jan. 7, 1974, at 4.
89
 The first serious look at advisory fee charges came during the investigations in the
1960's into the investment company industry. During the 1967 mutual fund hearings, the SEC
strongly urged that a rule of "reasonableness" be established by law as a limit on advisory fees
between investment companies and their advisers. Hearings on S. 1659 before the Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-24 (1967). The SEC's recommendation was
not adopted, but § 36 of the Investment Company Act, the fiduciary duty section, was
amended to establish by statute, that an adviser to an investment company has a fiduciary
duty with respect to the receipt of compensation. Investment Company Amendments Act of
1970, Pub. L, No. 91-54 § 20, 84 Stat. 1413, amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (1970). As far as
other kinds of investment advisers are concerned, the SEC maintains that an investment
adviser charging an advisory fee higher than those with whom he competes must disclose to
his clients ahead of time that the fee he charges is not the customary and usual fee. See, e.g.,
Ratan Moste Inc., CCH Mutual Funds Guide ¶ 10,070, at 12926 (1974); Commodity Mgmt.
Serv. Corp., CCH Mutual Funds Guide ¶ 10,035, at 12808 (1974). Moreover, the Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970 also introduced a new rule with respect to performance
fees. td„ § 25, It amended § 205 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8013-5 (1970),
to require that performance fees adjust normal advisory fees downward to the same extent
they are adjusted upward according to the performance of the client's portfolio.
98
 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l1) (1970).
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"Investment adviser" means any person who, for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others
. . . as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities . . . but does
not include . . (C) any broker or dealer whose perfor-
mance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of
his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no
special compensation therefor . . . . 9 '
To be sure, a number of broker-dealers do not rely on the statutory
exclusion to avoid registration because they or their advisory
affiliates charge management fees for providing investment advice
and hence are probably receiving "special compensation therefor." 92
Moreover, to an extent, the registered investment adviser credential
is a public relations asset which until now has outweighed the
relatively light burdens imposed by registration under the Act.
There are also many broker-dealers managing discretionary
accounts who are not registered because they do not understand the
limited scope of the statutory exclusion. It appears that those
broker-dealers being compensated for managing discretionary ac-
counts only by commissions generated through brokerage on clients'
trades are particularly vulnerable. And broker-dealers who refer
customers to affiliated or non-affiliated investment advisers in return
for some form of payment from the adviser for the referral may also
91
 Id. It seems that broker-dealers were not intended to be excluded from the definition
of investment adviser as the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Acts were
originally contemplated by the drafters. The proposed legislation submitted by the SEC
defined "investment adviser" for purposes of both titles as follows:
"Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensation, engages in the
business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to
the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analysis or reports concerning securities; but does not include (a) bank;
(b) any lawyer, accountant, engineer or teacher whose performance of such services is
solely incidental to the practice of his profession; (c) the publisher of any bona fide
newspaper or newsmagazine of general circulation; or (d) such other persons, not
within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and
regulations or order.
S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 45(a)(16) (1940). Moreover, broker-dealers were expressly
excluded from the application of Title I, Id., § 3(c)(2). See also Hearings on S. 3580 Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm, on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 181 (1940).
92 The hearings on S. 3580 show that broker-dealers receiving advisory fees were
intended to be included. Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. pt. 2, at 711 (1940). More important, the hearings on the
draft of the bill which became the Investment Company and Investment Advisers Act of
1940, confirm the Committee's conviction that the exclusion in § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C.
§ 801)-2a(11)(C) (1970), would not be available to broker-dealers receiving an advisory fee for
their investment advisory activities. See Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. on the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 87 (1940).
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be vulnerable. Such payments may be in the form of finder's fees or
advisory fee splits accomplished either by lump sum payment or by
payment of a regular portion of the adviser's receipts. Or the bro-
ker's reward may be less direct. The adviser may repay the favor of
referrals by using the referring broker-dealer to maintain custody of
advisory accounts and to execute trades for the accounts. Actually,
it may not even be necessary for there to be any arrangement,
formal or otherwise, between an adviser and a broker-dealer to
conclude that the broker-dealer is a statutory investment adviser. It
may be enough to require registration under the statute that the
referring broker-dealer arrange for himself to retain custodianship
and execution authority in anticipation of seeing increased turnover
of the account and hence in realizing more commissions.
Section 202(a)(11)(C) sets up two conditions to be satisfied for
broker-dealers to be excluded from the statutory definition of in-
vestment adviser. Furthermore, both conditions—the provision of
investment advice only as an incident of the broker-dealer function
and the absence of special compensation for the advice—must be
satisfied for the exclusion to operate because section 202(a)(11)(C)
lists them conjunctively. 93
 Unfortunately neither condition has had
an authoritative interpretation. The legislative history of section.
202(a)(11)(C) is thin," and there is no judicial construction on which
to rely. Shortly after the Advisers Act was adopted, the SEC issued
Investment Advisers Act Release Number 2, taking the position that
93 , Id. See text at note 91 supra.
94
 The meaning of the exclusionary language is unclear, since the meaning of "invest.
ment adviser" is discussed in the legislative history of the Act only in its broadest sense and by
repetition of the definition provided in the Act. It is clear that the definition was meant to
encompass a wider spectrum of "advisers" than members of the profession of investment
counselors:
Investment advisers are persons who for compensation engage in the business of
advising others . . . as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing or selling securities or who for compensation and as part of a regular
business, promulgate analyses or reports concerning securities.
H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 27 (1940). Similar language appears in S. Rep, No.
1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 20 (1940). David Schenker, Chief Counsel of the SEC Investment
Trust Study, stated that investment advisers are "that broad category ranging from people
who are engaged in the profession of furnishing disinterested, impartial advice to a certain
economic stratum of our population to the other extreme, individuals engaged in running
tipster organizations, or sending through the mails stock market letters." Hearings on S. 3580
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt.
1, at 47 (1940). Apparently, the only direct interpretation of •the exclusion at issue was made
by Douglas T. Johnson, Vice President of the Investment Counsel Association of America,
who said that the definition would still include "certain . . . brokerage houses which maintain
investment advisory departments and make charges for services rendered . . ." Id, pt. 2, at
711. Thus, the only theme that appears widely in the legislative history is that the statute is
meant to apply to those who render investment advice for compensation in the ordinary
course of their business or as an independent aspect thereof.
367
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
a commission surcharge based on advice to customers constitutes
special compensation. 95 But that release is of little help in evaluat-
ing arrangements in which the broker-dealer is ostensibly paid only
standard brokerage fees for executing transactions, 96 such as would
be the case where broker-dealers offer discretionary management
services for commissions, or where investment advisers offer
broker-dealers some kind of emolument, such as directing brokerage
business to them, for referring clients.
Despite the absence of authority, broker-dealers providing dis-
cretionary management services themselves or referring customers
to investment advisers who do offer such services are taking a great
risk that section 202(a)(11)(C) will be interpreted favorably to them,
or at least that the sanctions of the Advisers Act will not be ap-
plied retroactively to them. If they are subsequently held to be un-
registered investment advisers, their clients and customers have
available the remedy of total avoidance of previous contractual
arrangements, 97
 much as purchasers of unregistered securities have
available under the Securities Act. 98 Moreover, broker-dealers have
precious little ammunition to support them in arguments that sec-
tion 202(a)(11)(C) covers the discretionary management activities
they now promote.
The ready impression one gains from reading section
202(a)(11)(C) is that the statute excludes only the advice and recom-
mendations which are a normal part of a broker-dealer's attempts to
stimulate use of his trading and market-making capabilities. That
impression finds periodic reinforcement from several publications of
the SEC. The earliest is the description in Release Number 2 of
trading and market-making capabilities as the distinguishing fea-
tures of a broker-dealer operation. 99 Also, the 1963 Special Study of
95
 SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2 (Oct. 28, 1940).
96
 The release dealt only with the addition of an "overriding commission" or "service
charge" to the regular commission which a broker-dealer would receive from executing the
transaction. See id.
97
 Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 215(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (1970), which.
provides:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter and every
contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the viola-
tion of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of any
provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be
void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provision,
rule, regulation or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such
contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such
contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the
facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was in
violation of any such provision.
95
 Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
" SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2 (Oct. 28, 1940).
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the Securities Markets goes into great detail about the normal ac-
tivities of broker-dealers, including their provision of investment
advice, without any serious mention of discretionary management as
an activity requiring further regulation or even investigation.'"
Finally, the Advisory Committee Report on Small Account Invest-
ment Management Services refers to broker-dealer discretionary
management principally as a convenience service for investors, typi-
cally provided to customers who may be travelling or otherwise
unable to supervise their accounts day-to-day."'
There are sound policy reasons also for insisting that discretion-
ary management services and referrals by broker-dealers require
registration under the Advisers Act. Absent registration, broker-
dealers may obtain unwarranted competitive advantages over other
parties marketing discretionary management services by avoiding
the direct costs of registration such as fees, capitalization rules,
publication requirements, periodic reporting requirements, and so
forth. Equally important, without registration, broker-dealers may
be able to avoid many of the indirect costs of regulation that are a
necessary consequence of rules restricting advisory practices. Many
of the pending developments, described above,' 02 so likely to be-
come part of Advisers Act regulation, may well not become subject
to parallel regulation under the Exchange Act, with the result that
the burdens on broker-dealers for their discretionary advisory ac-
tivities would be lighter than the burdens on registered investment
advisers. Moreover, from the point of view of investor protection, it
is difficult to justify less onerous regulation for broker-dealers. Ques-
tions of relative competence aside, broker-dealers are far more likely
to be dealing with individual investors than other professional
money managers, and the SEC has always been most concerned
with the protection of individual investors.
In any event, close analysis of section 202(a)(11)(C) shows how
likely it is that all broker-dealers involved in the offering of dis-
cretionary management services will be required to register under
the Advisers Act. For ease of discussion, the analysis has been
broken down into two sections: one dealing with broker-dealers
managing discretionary accounts themselves or through affiliates;
and the other dealing with broker-dealers referring customers to
others for discretionary management.
1. Discretionary Management by Broker
-Dealers
No further discussion is necessary concerning broker-dealers
managing discretionary accounts for a specified fee above charges
111" See Special Study, supra note 18, pt. 5, ch. 3, at 49-107.
1 ° 1
 See Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 7, 60.
101
 See text at notes 84-89 supra.
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levied for other services, such as executions, margining securities,
research, custody of securities, and other kinds of services normally
a part of the broker-dealer operation. Investment Advisers Act
Release Number 2 establishes the SEC's position that charges levied
specifically for management are a form of special compensation for
advising clients about investing in securities.' 03 A different problem
arises when management services are offered without additional
charge beyond the fees associated with the trading, custodianship,
research, and other usual and customary services offered by broker-
age houses. In the typical case in which no specific charge is made
for discretionary management, such services are performed for
commissions on executions alone.'" The argument can be made
that section 202(a)(11)(C) applies to broker-dealers in such cases
because the broker-dealer manager is receiving no compensation,
much less special compensation, for managing the account, and
because the advisory services he is performing are merely incidental
to the usual conduct of his business.
The argument has surface appeal. The broker-dealer manager
is receiving no more for his discretionary management services than
he would if he were merely handling the account in the customary
non-discretionary way. That is, instead of contacting his clients
before every transaction, he has the authority to make investment
decisions without consultation. But except for that aspect of his
responsibilities, he treats his discretionary accounts no differently
from the way he treats his non-discretionary accounts. He obtains
the same quality of execution for each; he provides the same quality
of custodianship; and the research on which he bases his recommen-
dations to his non-discretionary clients is the same as the research on
which he bases his investment decisions for his discretionary ac-
counts. Furthermore, since execution capability, custodianship, and
research, the major components of broker-dealer managed dis-
cretionary accounts, are historically the identifying features of suc-
cessful brokerage houses, it would seem reasonable to regard the
additional factor of discretionary authority as merely incidental to
the brokerage business.
There are two essential faults with this logic. The first is the
assumption that because the charges assessed against discretionary
and non-discretionary customers are the same, the broker-dealer is
103 SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2 (Oct. 28, 1940). See text at notes 92-95
supra.
104 For a description of some of the operations of firms offering management for commis-
sions, see Andrews, Sanford Bernstein: What Makes Sandy Run?, Institutional Investor,
Sept. 1972, at 61; Andrews, Money Managers Discover the Little Guy, Signature, Oct. 1972,
at I.
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not being compensated specially for his advisory activities. The
fallacy lies in ascribing accuracy to the broker-dealer's description of
the purposes for which his charges are made. Although he may bill
discretionary and non-discretionary customers alike, it is a different
package of services he is providing to each. The brokerage industry
has historically used fixed fees for particular services, principally
commissions for trading services, to underwrite the costs of provid-
ing its customers other types of services. It is no different where
discretionary management services are concerned. Discretionary
management in exchange for brokerage fees is not a "free" service.
From the broker-dealer's point of view, his receipts are directly
related to the number and frequency of trades in securities he
executes. The anti-churning rules make it unlawful for broker-
dealers to increase the frequency of the trades they execute in order
to increase their commissions. As a consequence, broker-dealers can
increase their receipts only by offering additional services to attract
. accounts. Seen in this light, the offering of advisory services for
commissions alone actually represents broker-dealers' underwriting
with commission dollars the costs of providing discretionary man-
agement. The commissions an investor pays cover a combination of
services: (1) executions; and (2) discretionary management. At least
when investors establish brokerage accounts principally for dis-
cretionary management service rather than execution service, it is
reasonable to describe the broker-dealer's receipts as special com-
pensation "as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or
selling securities" within the language of section 202(a)(11)(C).' 05
The second fault is the failure to recognize how significant an
impact executions for discretionary accounts can have on a broker-
dealer's profit margin. Discretionary management is not simply
another service, like research or custodianship, with which a
broker-dealer can attract more customers. Discretionary manage-
ment Means much more efficient use of a broker-dealer's research
capabilities for his accounts and large economies of scale in execut-
ing transactions for his customers.
The increased efficiency and the use of the broker-dealer's
research services comes about through his complete authority to
determine when his own research should be acted upon. For non-
discretionary accounts, the broker-dealer must contact suitable cus-
tomers and persuade them of the merit of his work. Many such
customers do not avail themselves of the benefits of his research,
and those who do make up their minds at different times. Further-
more, non-discretionary customers frequently desire research assis-
10 ' 15 U.S.C.	 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (1970).
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tance on matters not of major interest to the broker-dealer, a service
which adds substantially to the broker-dealer's expenses. The bur-
dens of providing research services to discretionary accounts are
quite different. Not only does the broker-dealer evaluate his re-
search for the benefit of all suitable accounts at once, he can also
make the investment decision for all suitable accounts at the same
time. Moreover, it is relatively cheap for him to screen his discre-
tionary accounts to find out which clients should act on his invest-
ment plans based on his research. He does not need to call large
numbers of customers who live and work in different places, and
who have different attitudes and habits, and who may want differ-
ent or additional information. On the contrary, he identifies the
appropriate clients from information he has in his own files.
Even more valuable than the reduction in cost in identifying
the proper research for the proper customers is the pecuniary advan-
tage realized from executing all trades for discretionary accounts at
the same time. The stock exchange anti-rebate rules require the
broker-dealer to charge each client a commission exactly the same as
if the order had been executed for each account separately. 106 But a
combined order is not nearly as expensive to execute as it would be
if it had been executed separately for each account. As a conse-
quence, the broker-dealer can realize substantial profits similar to
those available when institutional trading was also done on a fixed-
commission basis. It is this surplusage which easily fits the definition
of special compensation required by the statute.""
A technical analysis of section 202(a)(11)(C) also shows that
discretionary management was not recognized by the drafters of the
statute to be incidental to normal brokerage activity. "Broker" is
"6
 E.g., NYSE Const. art. XV, § 2(a), which applies the commission rate schedule for
non-members to "that portion of any order involving an amount of $300,000 or less, or
business for non-members and allied members, including joint account transactions in which
any such person is interested . . ." NYSE Const. art. XV, § 1 proliides:
[Commissions] shall be charged and collected upon the execution of all orders for the
purchase or sale for the account of . . . parties not members or allied members of the
Exchange . . . and these commissions shall be at rates not less than the rates in this
Article prescribed; and shall be net and free from any rebate, return, discount or
allowance made in any shape and manner, or by any method or arrangement direct
or indirect. . .
1 " It may seem anomalous to condition registration of a broker-dealer on whether he
lumps trades or executes them separately by focusing on the additional profits a broker-dealer
receives through lumping as special compensation. But § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 § 80b-
2(a)(11)(C) (1970), is responsible for that consequence by focusing on the extent of compensa-
tion rather than the character of a broker-dealer's advisory activities as the determinant of
whether the statute requires registration as an investment adviser. In a world which regulated
members of the securities industry alike on the basis of their activities, true brokerage
business would not need an exemption from the Investment Advisers Act and all advisory
business would look to a common source of regulation. This issue is discussed more fully in
the conclusion. See text at notes 182-83 infra.
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defined in section 202(a)(3) as "any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others . . . ."" 8
"Dealer" is defined in section 202(a)(7) as "any person regularly
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own
account . ." 1 °9 Neither of these definitions implies the provision
of discretionary management services as part of the ordinary busi-
ness of a broker-dealer. It is particularly difficult to characterize
broker-dealers who manage a substantial number of discretionary
accounts as providing services incidental to their brokerage busi-
ness. Historical arguments about the structure of the industry at the
time the statute was drafted aside,'" broker-dealers who offer
discretionary-account advisory services are competing with invest-
ment advisers for advisory business far more than with other
broker-dealers for brokerage business, since the attraction to inves-
tors is the advisory service. Discretionary management for commis-
sions'alone in effect undercuts competing investment advisers in the
amount of the non-broker-dealer adviser's advisory fee. Had Con-
gress wished to exclude broker-dealers from Adviser Act regulation
of their advisory activities simply by virtue of their status as
broker-dealers, it surely would have done so in the same explicit
language with which it excluded banks.'"
Even if discretionary management services offered for commis-
sions alone could somehow fall within the section 202(a)(11)(C) ex-,
clusion, such arrangements will be virtually impossible to maintain
once fully negotiated commissions are introduced. Discretionary
managers are under a fiduciary duty to seek best execution on trades
for their clients. 12 Best execution has been interpreted to mean best
price, 13 although there is a substantial body of opinion that an
adviser may pay commissions above best price in return for research
for the accounts he manages. 114 But if an adviser pays a commission
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(3) {1970).
109
 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(7) (1970).
"IS See text at notes 99-101 supra.
Section 202(a){11) provides: "'Investment adviser' . . . does not include (A) a bank, or
any bank holding company as defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 which is not
an investment company. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1970).
'' See, e.g., Delaware Mgmt. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8128,
reprinted in [1966-67 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 77,458, at 82883 (July 19,
1967), Sacrificing best execution to serve the adviser's interest is not merely a breach of
fiduciary duty. It is also violative of the federal securities antifraud rules. See, e.g., Continen-
tal Inv. Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11072 (Oct. 24, 1974).
113
 See, e.g., Kidder, Peabody & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8426,
reprinted in [1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCU Fed, Sec. L. Rep. 77,618, at 83321 (Oct. 16,
1968).
1 4
 The SEC has been in the forefront of the movement to relax fiduciary obligations in
brokerage transactions. In SEC, Policy Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities
Markets, reprinted in [Special Studies Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 74,811, at
65611 (Feb. 2, 1972), the Commission expressly took the position that advisers could pay
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above the best price, he is paying special compensation for the
research. It is not payment merely for execution, since by hypothesis
he is paying for more than the cost of execution. Should this pay-
ment go to himself for his own research services, a broker-dealer
would be receiving special compensation for advising his clients.
Moreover, this kind of arrangement would place an intolerable
strain on the relationship between the broker-dealer manager and
his client. The manager would be left to decide not whether some-
one else's recommendations were good enough to justify payment of
extra commission dollars for them, but whether his own recommen-
dations warranted such additional compensation. It is difficult to see
how fiduciary principles could be construed to permit this. 15
2. Referrals
Not all broker-dealers have found it worthwhile to tap investor
interest in professional money management by offering discretionary
advisory services directly. Some have seen profit in referring their
customers to investment advisers in exchange for some form of
compensation for the referral. The SEC staff has taken a rather
commissions in excess of best price in exchange for services valuable to the client. Id. at
65620. Shortly thereafter, the Commission formally adopted the position taken in the Policy
Statement. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9598, reprinted in [1971-72 Trans-
fer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,776, at 81631 (May 9, 1972). Securities legislation
now pending in Congress expressly authorizes investment advisers to pay higher commissions
in exchange for research services. See note 86 supra. Despite these inroads into the fiduciary
duty of obtaining best price execution, it remains unclear whether these federal developments
can preempt state law on this issue.
ns Under principles of agency, for example, an agent "is subject to a duty to his
principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency."
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387, at 201 (1958). This is the "duty of loyalty," violation of
which could not be more effectively encouraged than by placing the agent in a position to
evaluate the quality of his own services and charge his principal accordingly.
The problem of a broker-dealer's paying higher commissions for his own research should
be distinguished from the problem of negotiating best-price commissions with himself. Unlike
the subjective valuation involved in assessing research, a broker-dealer has a reasonably
objective standard for determining what the cost to his client should be for buying and selling
securities since other houses will be setting prices which can be compared with those of the
managing broker-dealer. For more extensive discussion of this point, see text at notes 146-47
infra.
This conflict between the broker-dealers' trading activities and their fiduciary obligations
when acting as investment advisers became clear as a result of the passage of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (The Pension Reform Act) Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381). The law imposes specific standards of
conduct on "fiduciaries" connected with pension plans, prohibiting them from dealing with
plan assets for their own account or from personally benefiting from transactions involving
those assets. Id. Part 4, § 406. The provision would thus bar broker-dealers from handling
securities transactions for plans for which they serve as advisers. In response to industry
protest, broker-dealers were granted an exemption so that they could continue to provide
research services to plans as long as they did not charge separately for such advice. See The
Wall Street Journal, Feb. 14, 1975, at p. 28, col. 1.
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jaundiced view of referral fees, however, and it has denied no-
action letter requests involving such arrangements between broker-
dealers and investment advisers, even in the face of full disclosure to
the investor. 16 The staff's position, apparently, is that regularized
fee sharing through receipt of a portion of the advisory fee or
through reciprocal brokerage creates conflicts of interest so funda-
mental as to render the relationship inherently fraudulent or decep-
tive. On the other hand, the staff also seems to feel that associations
between investment advisers and broker-dealers are permissible. At
least if the broker-dealer receives only the ordinary brokerage as-
sociated with executing the trades recommended by the adviser, the
customer has the option to choose a different broker-dealer, and
there is full disclosure of the relationship.' 17
The staff's position was severely criticized at the PLI Fourth
Annual Institute on Securities Regulation.' 18 In addition, the Ad-
visory Committee on Investment Management Services for Indi-
vidual Investors sharply disagreed with the staffs conclusion that
fee sharing arrangements, when fully disclosed, could be fraudulent
or deceptive. 119 The Advisory Committee did feel, however, that
continuous fee sharing does put excessive strain on the fiduciary
relationships between the broker-dealer, the investment adviser and
the investor."° The Advisory Committee recommended that a one-
time finder's fee, reasonable in amount and fully disclosed, be per-
mitted referring broker-dealers."' Neither the Commission nor the
staff has indicated whether the Advisory Committee's recommenda-
tion is acceptable.
Perhaps because it is a relatively new regulatory issue, the SEC
has dealt with fee sharing arrangements rather insensitively.
Broker-dealers by trade are well suited to perform the "hand-
holding" function ' 22 that clients of discretionary managers seem so
'' 6 Sec, e.g., John C. 'read Co., CCH Mutual Funds Guide SI 9896, at 12559 (1973);
Argus Sec. Mgmt. Corp., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78366, at
80833 (1971); Reinholdt & Gardner, [1969.73 Transfer Binder] CCH Mutual Funds Guide
¶ 9213, at 11472 (1971).
127
 See Hartzmark & Co., CCH Mutual Funds Guide ¶ 9900, at 12563 (1973); Thomas
L. Gordon, CCH Mutual Funds Guide ¶ 9831, at 12434 (1973); Bacon, Whipple & Co.,
[1969-73 Transfer Binder] CCH Mutual Funds Guide SI 9673, at 12308 (1972). Cf. John G.
Kinnard & Co., CCH Mutual Funds Guide 11 9941, at 12631 (1973).
'" S. Friedman, Problems Involving Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers Serving
Individual Accounts, in Fourth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 295, 297-308 (PLI
Transcript Series) (1973).
Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 41.
' 20 Id.
' 1 ' Id.
127 "Hand-holding" is the term used by the advisory community to describe a close and
continuous relationship between a discretionary account manager and the account owner.
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much to need, and that some investment advisers seem so reluctant
to give. 123
 Also, referral fees can be a form of compensation to
broker-dealers for evaluating various investment advisers for the
customers they are referring. To a certain extent, referral fees in this
context serve the purpose the commissions broker-dealers receive for
selling sales-load mutual funds were supposed to serve but never
did.' 24At the PLI Conference, Commissioner Pollock indicated that
the major concern of the SEC is that referral fees will become
marketing devices for investment advisory services.' 25 But even if
referral fees were only compensation for marketing services, that is
precisely the function a middleman is supposed to serve. It is
elementary that absent collusive agreements or government-enforced
restrictions on competition, where there is full and fair disclosure, a
middleman reduces the cost of the final product to a consumer and
improves its quality to boot.' 26 Instead, the concern of the SEC
should be that the information customers of broker-dealers receive
be sufficient to permit intelligent investor choices about the advisory
services recommended to them. If that is the case, the referral fees
l2'
	 has a pejorative connotation because some account managers view
contacts with the client as burdensome and inefficient. Client contact is said to take up a great
deal of time which could be better spent analyzing investment opportunities. See Advisory
Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 30; Andrews, Money Managers Discover the Little Guy,
Signature, Oct. 1972, at I.
124
 Like individual investment advisers, the product of mutual funds is professional
investment management for which the client of an investment adviser and the shareholder in
a mutual fund pay an advisory fee. Brokers do not sell no-load mutual funds because the sales
load represents the underwriting commission, nearly all of which goes to the selling broker.
The sales load is supposed to be the only compensation received by the broker. In theory, this
commission compensates a broker for identifying the best-managed funds having the invest-
ment goals of the investor. Most will concede, however, that brokers performed this function
poorly, if at all. In the heyday of mutual fund growth, the major interest of brokers in selling
mutual funds shares was the receipt of reciprocal brokerage from the fund for selling its
shares, a fact which was never disclosed to sales-load mutual fund purchasers. The courts and
the Commission have since made it fairly plain that reciprocity for selling fund shares is
unlawful. See, e.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971); SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 10,439 (Oct, 19, 1973) (adoption of Rule 15b10-10). But even now, there is
little incentive for broker-dealers to perform any substantial evaluative and monitoring
function for customers they place in mutual funds. There still is no requirement for them to
disclose that other mutual funds can be purchased for different underwriting commissions and
that no-load mutual funds can be purchased for no underwriting commission at all. Thus,
they still view the load only as compensation for servicing the fund because they do not have
to justify their commissions to their customers as compensation for aid in finding a suitable
well-managed fund, and for assistance in watching the management of the fund.
125
 Fourth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 305-07 (PLI Transcript Series)
(1973).
126
 See, e.g., A. Alchian & W. Allen, University Economics 35-46 (3d ed. 1972). There is
evidence that investors already recognize the value of having independent experts assess the
work of professional money managers. A number of firms whose principle line of business
consists of evaluating performance and management services have come into being. Cf. Levy,
How to Measure Research Performance, 1 J. of Portfolio Mgmt., Fall 1974, at 44. Broker-
dealers are in an excellent position to provide this kind of service, expecially to individual
investors.
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broker-dealers receive will be accurate reflections of the services
they are providing investors, not hidden profits obtained by over-
charging investors for assistance of doubtful value.
There is a more important consideration in favor of permitting
fully disclosed fee sharing arrangements between broker-dealers and
investment advisers. Broker-dealers who receive compensation in
any form for making referrals are not mere middlemen without any
initial or continuing obligation to their clients. By virtue of the
consideration they receive for making referrals, they should be held
to be statutory investment advisers, and thus subject to the regula-
tory restrictions against self-dealing imposed by the Advisers Act.
Thus, in addition to the regulatory protection of the Advisers Act
provided investors with respect to their portfolio managers, inves-
tors will benefit by having another financially responsible party to
answer for the breaches of duty of the adviser, at least if the
referring broker-dealer was or should have been aware of the ad-
viser's breach of duty. This factor not only enhances investor protec-
tion in cases of actual wrongdoing, but also encourages broker-
dealers to watch over advisers to prevent wrongdoing.
The application of the Advisers Act to referring broker-dealers
can be explained in two ways. Under standard common-law
analysis, participation in the advisory fee, which is the consideration
paid by the investor for advisory services, makes the broker-dealer
responsible along with the investment adviser for the performance
of the obligations of the advisory contract. 121 Under analysis of the
127 There are several theories under which a continuing duty to monitor and evaluate the
adviser might be imposed on the broker-dealer. The adviser and broker-dealer might be
regarded as joint venturers in managing the client's account, the adviser assuming principal
responsibility for investment decisions and the broker-dealer assuming principal responsibility
for executions and custody of the portfolio. Or, by virtue of the broker-dealer's power to
promote an advisory relationship between the client and adviser, the broker-dealer might be
regarded as the agent and the adviser as a sub-agent of the client.
(An agent is liable to his principal] if, having a duty to appoint or to supervise other
agents, he has violated his duty through lack of care or otherwise in the appointment
or supervision, and harm therefore results to the principal in a foreseeable manner.
Ile is also subject to liability if he . . permits, or otherwise takes part in the
improper conduct of other agents.
Restatement (Second) of Agency 405(2), at 251 (1958). The critical elements of these and
other common-law theories of recovery are the position the broker-dealer occupies with
respect to selection of an adviser and the compensation the broker-dealer receives for his
efforts. To the extent a broker-dealer aids an investor in selecting an adviser, the broker-
dealer represents that he has the professional ability to choose an adviser offering competent
advisory services. He owes the client a duty of ordinary skill and care in executing this
responsibility. Moreover, the referral fee is consideration for assuming that duty. If the
broker-dealer also receives continuing compensation during the life of the advisory agreement,
the only reasonable explanation for such compensation is that it is in exchange for the
assumption of continuing duties with respect to the account. Any other interpretation would
allow the broker-dealer the right to profit on a regular basis from the advisory relationship
without any corresponding duty to the client.
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Advisers Act, the broker-dealer's receipt of compensation for pro-
moting the creation of a discretionary account makes him a statu-
tory investment adviser. 128 Once again, the explanation lies in the
expansion of the meaning of investment contract, since the Howey
decision, to include discretionary accounts. 129
The definition of security is as broad in the Advisers Act as it is
in the Securities Act, and there is no reason to believe that it will be
given any different scope. As a result, any referral made by a
broker-dealer for the purpose of promoting a discretionary manage-
ment relationship makes the broker-dealer an "investment adviser"
under the Advisers Act:' a "person who, for compensation, engages
in the business of advising others . . . as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities . . ." 13 ° Moreover,
the exclusion of section 202(a)(11)(C) is of no value since the
broker-dealer would be receiving special compensation. Even in
situations in which the broker-dealer is not compensated directly for
the referral, he would have to rely for exclusion from registration on
having his referral regarded as solely incidental to his broker-dealer
activity. Certainly the SEC is not likely to sympathize with such an
interpretation, and given the absence of any established practice on
the part of broker-dealers to act as intermediaries in bringing inves-
tors and advisers together, it is difficult to imagine the courts react-
ing any differently.
D. Brokerage for Managed Accounts
One of the more remarkable regulatory controversies of the last
several years has been the issue of whether broker-dealers should
execute trades for their own managed accounts. Two years ago, the
SEC adopted Rule 19b-2 131 pursuant to section 19(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act. 132
 Rule 19b-2 does not prohibit broker-dealers
from executing trades for their managed accounts, but it requires a
broker-dealer to execute at least 80% of its business on an exchange
with non-affiliated persons. 133 "Affiliates" are defined as persons in
1211
 See Dillon, Read & Co., CCH Mutual Funds Guide 1 9903, at 12573 (1973) (broker-
dealer splitting advisory fees with operator of information retrieval system is investment
adviser to clients of operator).
129
 See text at notes 31-64 supra.
13 ° Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1970). The SEC
recently took this position, in FPC Securities Corp., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 80,072, at
85008 (Sept. 9, 1974). See also note 91 supra.
' 31 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1974).
132
 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1970).
133 Rule 19b-2 provides:
(a) [A] member [of an exchange] shall be deemed to have such a purpose [the
conduct of a public securities business] if at least 80 percent of the value of exchange
securities transactions effected by it during the preceding 6 calender months,
whether as a broker or dealer, is effected for or with persons other than affiliated
persons . . .
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a control relationship with the broker-dealer, principals of the
broker-dealer, and investment companies for which the firm acts as
adviser or has a control relationship with the adviser. 134 It now
seems that Rule 19b-2 was only the beginning. Five months after
the adoption of Rule 19b-2, the Senate passed S. 470 which, among
other things, prohibits broker-dealers from executing transactions on
an exchange for themselves, their affiliates, and all managed institu-
tional accounts.' 35 In effect, only the managed accounts of indi-
vidual investors are left untouched. Pending in the House is H.R.
10, which, as currently drafted, would also prohibit broker-dealers
from executing transactions on an exchange for themselves, their
affiliates and all discretionary or non-discretionary advisory clients
of a firm other than individuals.' 36
The justification for separating brokerage from money man-
agement is that such a restriction eliminates serious conflicts-of-
interest.'" If brokers may trade for the accounts they manage, the
results, it is feared, will be churning,'" sacrifice of best execu-
tion,' 39 dumping, 140 and scalping either for the benefit of the
broker-dealer manager himself or for the benefit of one class of his
customers over another."' But insofar as institutional investors are
17 C.F.R. §240.19b-2 (1974). To assist market liquidity, the rule contains eight exceptions for
purposes of calculating transactions with affiliates. See id.
134
 Rule 19b-2(b) defines affiliated person as one controlling, controlled by, or in common
control with, a member; or as a principal officer, stockholder, or partner of a member; as an
investment company advised by a member of any person controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with a member. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1974).
135 S. 470, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1973), reintroduced as part of S. 249, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess, (1975).
136
 H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975.
117 Senate Study, supra note 4, at 75-77.
13° Churning is the excessive turnover of an account. While churning is easier to do with
discretionary accounts than with non-discretionary accounts, a broker-dealer who induces
clients to buy and sell securities for no real purpose beyond producing commission income is
guilty of churning. See Special Study, supra note 20 pt. I, at 271.
114 "Best execution" is not given to precise definition. While it generally refers to
executions producing the best price for the client, see text at notes 112-13 supra, where price is
not different among traders, best execution includes the obligation to select traders who will
carry out the transaction most efficiently and are most likely to deliver according to the terms
of the purchase or sale. There is also a large body of opinion that an adviser may sacrifice best
price execution to purchase research or other services with the extra commission dollars
generated in a trade without sacrificing best execution. See text at notes 114-15 supra.
"Dumping" is the term used to describe the placement of over-valued stock owned by
the adviser or by one of his more favored accounts into one or more of his less favored
accounts. Dumping was a particularly severe abuse of investment company managers prior to
passage of the Investment Company Act. See Investment Trust Study, supra note 4, pt. 3, at
2581. Now there is concern that investment advisers will use their discretionary accounts as
recepticles for difficult-to-position block trades. Senate Study, supra note 4, at 76.
141 "Scalping" describes the purchase or sale of securities by an investment adviser in
advance of substantial purchases or sales by his clients. In this fashion, he hopes to profit by
the price rises associated with the purchases he makes for his other clients and to sell for a
higher price by avoiding the downward pressure on the market that may result from sales by
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concerned, the evidence that conflicts-of-interest associated with
combined brokerage and management are real and serious is at best
scanty. 142 Certainly, the congressional reports recommending sep-
aration of brokerage and management offered little to support their
position."3
 The more probable explanation is a political one. In-
his clients. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), supra note
80.
1 " Since 1958, there have been a variety of official inquiries of greater or lesser depth
into the advisory activities of broker-dealers. The Wharton Study of Mutual Funds found a
mild indication that portfolio turnover was higher for mutual funds affiliated with brokers',
although the largest funds apparently experienced lower turnover than average. SEC, A
Study of Mutual Funds 224-26 (1962). The Report also speculated that the high concentration
of executions with broker-affiliates, id. at 473-75, indicated that such mutual funds may have
been sacrificing certain service benefits that may have been obtained by executing elsewhere.
Id. at 32. The Special Study of the Securities Markets found ample evidence of churning,
dumping, sacrifice of best execution, and preferential treatment of customers, but made no
distinction between managed and non-managed accounts. Special Study, supra note 18, at
297-98, 371-74, 958-59. The SEC Report on Investment Company Growth found, contrary to
the Wharton Report, that median turnover rates for broker-affiliated investment companies
were below industry averages. SEC, Report on the Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, H. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1966). The SEC speculated
without evidence that broker affiliation might lead to sacrifice of best execution, but spe-
cifically declined to recommend legislation limiting such affiliations if commission income
were a factor in setting advisory fees. Id. at 190.
Next came extensive legislative efforts leading to the 1970 amendments to the Investment
Company Act. See S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. Rep. Nos. 91-1382,
91-1631, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Hearings on S. 34 & S. 296 Before the Senate Banking
and Currency Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on H.R. 11995,
H.R. 13754, H.R. 14737, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st _Sess. (1969).
The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 became law on December 14, 1970.
Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413. Throughout this period, there was
no sentiment to change § 17(e) of the Act, 80 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1970), which permits
broker-affiliates of investment companies to receive normal commissions on executions for
such companies. In 1971, the SEC focused specifically on the reasons for institutional
affiliations with broker-dealers. It found three reasons for such affiliations: (1) reduction of
brokerage casts to managed accounts; (2) diversification of business activities; and (3) desire
for distribution facilities. Institutional Investor Study, supra note 1, pt. 4, at 2296. The results
of regression analysis of the collected data show a mildly higher turnover for affiliated
accounts, id., pt. 2, at 173, 363, but lower advisory fees for affiliated accounts. Id., pt. 2, at
213. The only conflict-of-interest identified as serious was the preferential treatment of certain
accounts, although even here the data suggested that managed accounts were beneficiaries
rather than victims. Id., pt. 2 at 372-74. Indeed, the letter of transmittal accompanying the
Study explicitly asserted the Study had found no demonstrated need for separating brokerage
and management. Id., summary vol., at xx.
143
 The section of the House Report dealing with the conflicts of interest involved in
combining brokerage and management, House Study, supra note 4, at 148-53, should be a
source of professional embarrassment to those who drafted it. Justification for the Subcommit-
tee's position is contained in seven footnotes. See id. at 148-49, nn.4-10. These citations are to
treatises, articles and to cases at most only modestly helpful. There is nothing empirical except
the information incorporated from findings in parts of the Special Study, supra note 18. House
Study, supra note 4, id. at 148-49 nn.4 & 5. The House Report did not even refer to testimony
in its own subcommittee's hearings which tended to substantiate, though not establish, some
need for separation of brokerage and management. See, e.g., Hearings on the Study of the
Securities Industry before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on
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stitutional investment advisers lacking execution capability were
able to promote the conflict-of-interest issue into congressional en-
dorsement of their desire to eliminate the capability of broker-
dealers to execute for their managed accounts because of the com-
petitive advantage involved.'"
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 92-37h, pt. 9, at 4271-72,
4274 (1972) (churning); id. at 4281 (dumping). The Senate Report at least referred to some
credible evidence of dumping by block positioners into managed accounts, Senate Study,
supra note 4, at 76, but it relied primarily on testimony about the potential for abuse to
substantiate the need for adopting a rule to deal with the abuse. Id. at 75-77 nn.68-75.
144 When declining commission profits attributable to volume discounts, negotiated
commissions and declining markets led to increasing broker-dealer entry into institutional
investment management, other professional investment managers began to find themselves in
an unfortunate position. The stock-exchange anti-rebate rules prevented them from recover-
ing commissions for the benefit of their clients, and hence deprived their clients of effectively
reduced advisory fees. Broker-dealers, on the other hand, knew that they would profit from
commissions and were able to set lower advisory fees than their non-member competitor
advisers. Non-member advisers reacted strongly to this phenomenon principally by seeking
membership on stock exchanges to recapture commissions. NYSE members predictably
responded by attempting to bar institutional advisers, the broker-dealers' most important
potential competitors for brokerage business, from membership by restricting membership to
organizations doing primarily a public business. See NYSE Rule 318.12. But faced with an
antitrust challenge to their position by one of the country's largest institutional investors, see
Hearings on the Study of the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No.
92-37g, pt. 8, at 4122-31 (1972), the NYSE, supported both by members offering management
services and those not offering such services but fearful of losing institutional commission
income, and armed with a special report written by William McChesney Martin, raced to
Washington to enlist the SEC in protecting their interests by barring institutions from direct
access to the exchanges. See W.M. Martin, The Securities Markets: A Report with Recom-
mendations, reprinted in [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 78,184, at
78183 (1971). The result was Rule 19b-2, which went beyond even the NYSE limitations on
access to membership for firms affiliated with institutions. 17 C.F.R. § 240.194-2 (1974).
The course of events leading to the adoption of Rule 19b-2 makes the political explana-
tion of the congressional response particularly persuasive. Even though Rule 19b-2 was
adopted four months after the House Securities Industry Study was published, it is plain from
the SEC report accompanying the issuance of Rule 19b-2 that conflicts-of-interest had little to
do with the adoption of the Rule. Almost the entire substantive justification for the Rule
derives from a perceived need to retain the "public" character of the markets and to save the
market from institutional domination. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, at
10-36, 45-53, 90-129, 130-134 reprinted in summary form in [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,178, at 82583 (Jan. 16, 1973). Yet Rule 19b-2 does nothing to
diminish institutional domination of member firms. On the contrary, Rule 19b-2 was designed
to permit a member to manage nothing but institutional business so long as the firm was not
in a control relationship with the institutions it was managing. Furthermore, control is defined
rather liberally. Control is presumed if one person has a right to participate to the extent of
more than twenty-five percent in the profits of the other person or owns more than twenty-five
percent of the outstanding voting securities of the other person. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2
(1974). As further proof that competitive advantage rather than conflict-of-interest lies at the
heart of the brokerage and money management issue, not all stock exchanges were ecstatic
about Rule 19b-Z. Several exchanges had expanded their membership by making their
facilities available to institutional advisers as a means of recapturing excess commissions. See,
e.g., Welles, The War Between the Big Board and The Regionals: What it Means to the
Business, Institutional Investor, Dec. 1970, at 21. The PBW Exchange was so upset by Rule
19b-2 that it filed suit against the Commission to prevent enforcement of the rule, though it
met with no success. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973).
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The irony is that, although separation of brokerage from man-
agement is all but settled for institutional accounts, 145 broker-
dealers are to be permitted to continue executing for managed
individtial accounts. If there were any group of investors seriously
threatened by the conflicts-of-interest listed above, it would be that
of the individual investor. Arguably, individual investors lack the
sophistication necessary to understand when they are being vic-
timized by over-trading, inferior executions, or dumping. Perhaps
because non-broker-dealer investment advisers managing individual
accounts lacked the lobby of the institutions, or because such advis-
ers are dependent on the good graces of broker-dealers in obtaining
referrals, individual investors have not been deemed in need of the
protection being afforded the institutions.
The exclusion of individual accounts from the proposed prohi-
bition on brokerage for managed accounts, however, does not mean
that the regulatory climate for broker-dealers managing accounts for
individuals will remain unchanged. For one thing, the separation
of brokerage and management for institutional accounts permits
federal and state authorities to concentrate more regulatory and
enforcement effort on broker-dealers executing for their managed
accounts. But a far more important phenomenon affecting the ar-
rangements between broker-dealers and their managed accounts is
the introduction of negotiated commission rates. For it will soon be
possible, by the simple device of applying all commission income
against the advisory fee, to eliminate many of conflicts-of-interest
arising out of a broker-dealer manager's dual status.
Temptations to churn in order to promote the broker-dealer
manager's own commission income, as the Senate Securities Indus-
try Study notes, can be eliminated by crediting profits received
from in-house executions against the advisory fee.'" Similarly,
1" At one time, the House Subcommittee responsible for H.R. 5050 approved an
amendment that would permit broker-dealers to execute for unaffiliated managed accounts.
See Wall Street Letter, Aug. 12, 1974, at 3, col. I. But opposition to modification of the
absolute prohibition of the original bill was immediate and firm. Indeed, the source and
intensity of the opposition gives added weight to the view that the presence of conflicts-of-
interest does not explain the separation of brokerage and management. Broker-dealers were
afraid banks and insurance companies would enter into competition with their brokerage
business. And banks and insurance companies were afraid broker-dealers would gain an
advantage in competing for institutional accounts, See Securities Week, Aug. 26, 1974, at 4.
Eventually, H.R. 5050 was marked up and reported out of committee prohibiting combined
brokerage and management, but permitting the SEC to exempt managers providing only
advisory services to managed accounts. See id., Oct. 14, 1974, at 2. The purpose of the
exemption is to enhance the competitive position of broker-dealers but it apparently faces a
doubtful future. See Securities Week, Nov. 11, 1974, at 2; Wall Street Letter, Nov. 11, 1974,
at 1; Id., Oct. 14, 1974 at 6, col. 2.
146 Senate Study, supra note 4, at 75. After reciprocal brokerage practices fell into
regulatory disfavor, a number of institutions began joining various securities exchanges, either
directly or through affiliates, in order to reduce commission expense and to recapture commis-
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temptations toward deliberate sacrifice of best execution by a
broker-dealer manager for his own pecuniary benefit, through
choice of an inferior market, can be handled in the same way as
churning. By crediting all profits from commissions against advisory
fees, incentives to sacrifice best execution disappear. Even where
the conflict-of-interest pressuring best execution is more subtle than
choice of market, the problem is more apparent than real. For
example, good faith notwithstanding, it may look improper to have
a broker-dealer negotiate a "fair" commission with a discretionary
account. But if commission profits are credited against advisory fees
and best execution is equated with best price for house-managed
accounts, 147 the only risk to the client is that his broker-dealer
manager will be mistaken about the place for best execution, not
that the manager's judgment will be colored by an opportunity for
personal gain.
. There is ample reason to believe that arrangements which
credit commission income against advisory fees would evolve with-
out regulation after negotiated commissions become law. Even in
the fixed-commission era, many broker-dealers were offering re-
duced advisory fees in anticipation of commission income. 148 But it
is entirely possible that existing principles of fiduciary responsibility
will oblige broker-dealer managers to forego profits on trades exe-
cuted for managed accounts. The present barrier to such arrange-
ments is the stock exchange anti-rebate rules which are soon to fall
victim to negotiated rates. Once managers obtain the authority to
return profits from commissions to clients, fiduciary law may pre-
vent them from choosing their own houses for executions if they will
receive profits from the commissions beyond those available from
the advisory fee.' 49
In addition to conflicts-of-interest involving the frequency and
quality of executions, the Senate and House studies of the securities
industry also mention other conflicts-of-interest said to be associated
with the combination of brokerage and management. Analysis
shows that two of the suggested conflicts-of-interest, however much
of a problem they may be, have little to do with a broker-dealer
manager's dual status. One is
 preferential treatment for managed
Mons. See id. at 64-74. Even before reciprocity fell into official disapproval, a number of
broker-dealer managers were setting lower advisory fees for their clients in anticipation of the
commission income. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 1972, 3118, col. 2 (describing a
small NYSE member firm which managed its; awn mutual fund). The advisory contract
provided that one-third of the brokerage fees received from the fund were to offset the
management company's fees.
147
 Fiduciary principles will not permit a broker-dealer manager to execute in-house at
greater than best price. See text at notes 112-15 supra.
'" See Institutional Investor Study, supra note I, at 213. See note 146 supra.
149 See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 184, 974 (1963).
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accounts. Certainly, preference given such accounts is no cause for
concern for those clients. It is the firm's other customers who suffer
the injury, if any.'s° But unless those other customers are being led
to believe they are receiving the same services at the same time as
the managed accounts, the issue seems to be more one of public
policy (i.e., whether such preferences should be permitted) than
conflict-of-interest. In any event, it is difficult to understand how
preferential treatment will be affected by separating brokerage and
management. Research will still go first to the more valued custom-
ers, meaning, apparently, the managed accounts. Furthermore,
executions also will go first to the managed accounts in the firms
which give them preferential treatment. Insofar as institutional in-
vestors are concerned, the only difference resulting from the pending
House and Senate bills would be that the trades will be executed by
other houses. Then there is the question of scalping, the other
conflict-of-interest having little to do with combined brokerage and
management. Apparently the House subcommittee believes there
will be less scalping if brokerage is separated from management. Is'
But all scalping requires is that the scalper trade for his own
account 152
 or for his favored accounts' 53 in advance of making
purchases or sales for his managed accounts. No scalper needs to
employ his own brokerage facilities to engage in such a perversion of
his fiduciary duty.
Dumping is the one conflict-of-interest identified by the House
and Senate securities-industry studies which is associated with
brokerage for managed accounts and which cannot be eliminated by
negotiated commission rates. Broker-dealers may take over-valued
stock from inventory or from favored accounts and place it into
less-favored accounts. If the problem is serious, temptations to
dump can be eliminated by prohibiting the broker-dealer manager
from dealing with the client as principal or as agent for another.
However, no such prohibition is necessary so long as the broker-
dealer makes full disclosure to his client and receives advance writ-
L'" Absolute fairness in the sense of equal treatment for all accounts may be impossible to
achieve in any event. As the Institutional Investor Study noted, "delaying executions for
discretionary accounts while awaiting the decisions of the other advisory clients might be
considered a breach of the adviser's duty to the discretionary account." Institutional Investor
Study, supra note I, at 349 n.171.
151
 House Study, supra note 4, at 148-49.
152 Scalping for one's own account is a statutory, if not common-law, fraud. See SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 201 (1963).
153 it is difficult to determine the basis on which an adviser would prefer one set of
discretionary accounts above another set of discretionary accounts, but apparently some firms
may favor institutional clients over public clients and some do precisely the opposite. See
Folk, Restructuring the Securities Markets—The Martin Report: A Critique, 57 Va. L. Rev.
1315, 1363-64 (1971).
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ten approval from his client to consummate the transaction—along
the lines now required by section 206(3) of the Advisers Act.' 54
Moreover, an absolute law of this type can be harmful to clients.
For example, both pending bills, recognizing that block positioners
often act to their client's benefit in trading as principa1, 155 exempt
such transactions from the proposed statutory prohibition against
combined brokerage and management.' 56
III. CONCLUSION
In light of the current state of the federal securities laws,
broker-dealers offering discretionary management services face an
unhappy future. Unless the Continental Commodities' 57 construc-
tion of investment contract is undercut, 158 discretionary accounts
will have to be registered as securities. Unless the SEC's position in
the First National City Bank 159 case is modified, the discretionary
accounts, taken collectively,' 60 of an individual broker-dealer will
have to be registered as an investment company. Unless section
154 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any investment advisory by the use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly—
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or
purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than such
client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the account of
such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion of such
transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client
to such transaction .. . .
155 Block positioners prefer not to tie up their own capital when they handle orders for
their customers. A price must be provided, however, within a reasonable period of time,
which usually precludes the collection of sufficient commitments on the other side of the order
to match the initial customer's desires. The result is that a block positioner may have to
inventory part of the position himself, Given the capital it requires, the number of block
positioners is small. To prohibit such houses from executing block transactions for their
advisory clients would effectively cut their clients out from a significant portion of the market,
and would thus disadvantage block positioning houses in the provision of management
services. For a discussion of the mechanics of block trading, see Institutional Investor Study,
supra note 1, pt. 4, at 1584-1720.
156 S, 470 § 2, amendment to § 11 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1970),
§ 11(f)(2XC); H.R. 5050 § 205, amendment to the Securities Exchange Act, § 11(a)(2)(C).
157 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974),
. 158 See notes 44-46 supra.
159 Sce text at note 60 supra.
199 The SEC takes the position that common management can create a statutory invest-
ment company even when the accounts of investors are being handled by an exempt institu-
tion. It regards the group of accounts together as the investment company, whatever the
character of the institution providing management services. This theory of the creation of a
statutory investment company is called the "ectoplasmic theory" and was successfully litigated
to a conclusion in Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964), in which it was applied against the separate account
underlying a variable annuity program.
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202(a)(11) 1 51
 is interpreted generously, broker-dealer discretionary
managers will have to be registered as Advisers Act investment
advisers.' 62 And unless there is a change in political attitudes,
broker-dealers will be restricted from trading for managed institu-
tional accounts and restrained in trading for managed individual
acco unts. 163
These developments also present serious problems for broker-
dealers making referrals to others offering discretionary manage-
ment services. Once it is established that discretionary accounts are
statutory securities, such broker-dealers would be Securities Act
statutory underwriters,'" Investment Company Act principal un-
derwriters if they shared fees for the referrals,' 65 and Investment
Company Act statutory underwriters otherwise.' 66 They also would
probably have to be registered as Advisers Act investment advis-
ers.' 67 And finally, depending on the final construction of the legis-
lation prohibiting combined brokerage and management, they may
well have to give up trading on an exchange for accounts they have
referred.' 68
If the securities laws and regulations had been purposely de-
signed to create uncertainty and discourage broker-dealer entry into
the discretionary advisory business without expressly prohibiting
broker-dealers from offering such services, it is hard to imagine how
this could have been better accomplished. To be sure, much of what
the broker-dealers face is also faced by other, more traditional,
investment advisers. If a discretionary account is a security for a
broker-dealer, it is similarly classified for every other type of man-
161 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (1970).
162 See text at notes 103-15 supra.
165
 See text at notes 131-36 supra.
164 See note 32 supra.
' 65
 The definition of "principal underwriter" in § 2(a)(29) of the Investment Company
Act includes "any underwriter . . . who as agent . . . sells any ... security lin an investment
company] . . . to the public . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(29) (1970). For a definition of
underwriter, see note 166 infra.
166
 The definition of "underwriter" in § 2(a)(40) of the Investment Company Act includes
"any person who . . . sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or
participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking . . . ." 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2(a)(40) (1970).
167
 See text at notes 127-30 supra.
' 68
 The construction of § 205 of H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), (reintroduced
as H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975) is to prohibit exchange transactions between the
broker-dealer manager and any affiliated person. Affiliate is defined to include any member
"empowered to determine what securities or other property shill be purchased or sold or is
otherwise authorized to select the securities bought or sold." Id. This language could well be
interpreted to apply to broker-dealers who act as custodians and brokers for accounts referred
to other investment advisers because of their duties as custodians and brokers and because of
the continuing obligation of such broker-dealers to evaluate and monitor the management of
these accounts. See text at notes 127-30 supra.
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ager. If a.set of discretionary accounts is an investment company, it
is so whatever type of manager acts as adviser. As a tactical matter,
however, the SEC is not going to establish a new regulatory regime
by attacking its strongest adversaries. Banks, investment counselors
and insurance companies have been offering discretionary manage-
ment services for years without any suggestion from the Commission
that solely because of their discretionary management activities,
they have been issuing registered securities or managing unregis-
tered investment companies. 169 Moreover, the clientele of these
advisers is typically made up of institutions and wealthy individu-
als. Measured by need for federal securities law protection, such an
environment would severely test the statutory security and invest-
ment company analogies.
But the broker-dealer community presents a different kind of
target. Measured by its impact, it is a relatively new entrant into the
discretionary management business. Also, although the situation
has its ironies, broker-dealers offering discretionary management
services present an inferior regulatory posture to that of other in-
vestment managers. Broker-dealers, with a long history of tight
regulation for all their traditional activities, give the impression of
requiring comparable regulation for their discretionary management
activities; yet their discretionary management activities are currently
the least regulated of those of all investment managers. Finally, and
perhaps most important of all, a far greater proportion of the
discretionary management business of broker-dealers is directed at
individual investors of modest means. As Continental Commodities,
the pyramid and condominium cases under the Securities Act,'"
and First National City Bank under the Investment Company
Act,' 71 demonstrate, the SEC is especially vigorous about extending
its jurisdiction to cover previously unregulated securities matters
169 It is not entirely accurate to say the Commission has given no indication that
discretionary management by investment advisers of a more traditional type may require
registration under and compliance with various federal securities laws. In the spring of 1974,
the Commission requested comment on its role, in dealing with bank-sponsored investment
services. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5491, reprinted in t1973-74 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,767, at 84070 (Apr. 30, 1974). See note 65 supra.
''° A discussion of the factors that would cause the SEC to find that a condominium
offering is an offer for sale of a security is found in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347,
reprinted in [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. Rep. 11 79,163, at 82535 (Jan. 4, 1973).
Several commentators have addressed the matter of condominiums as securities. E.g., Clur-
man, Condominiums as Securities: A Current Look, 19 N.Y. L. Forum 457 (1974); Dickey &
Thorpe, Federal Security Reglation of Condominium Offerings, 19 N.Y.L. Forum 473 (1974);
Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominiums and the Federal Securities Laws—A Case Study in
Governmental Inflexibility, 60 Va. L. Rev. 785 (1974). The principal pyramid cases are SEC
V. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterpsl, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
171
 See text at notes 61-70 supra.
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having dangerous potential for unsophisticated individual inves-
tors.' 72
It may be, of course, that broker-dealer expansion into money
management -is contrary to the public interest. Perhaps, because of
the ease of entry into the brokerage industry, there is too great a
possibility that investors will entrust their assets to unscrupulous or
incompetent persons.'" Or perhaps, the proper functioning of the
securities markets requires broker-dealers to concentrate on trading
and distributing securities to the exclusion of other activities.
Neither Congress nor the SEC has publicly taken such a position.
On the contrary, public statements have been to the effect that
unfair restrictions on broker-dealer competition for advisory busi-
ness are not desirable policy.' 74 Presumably, then, regulatory de-
velopments should not be accomplishing indirectly what is disa-
vowed officially.
There is another explanation for the unsettled state of affairs
respecting the provision of discretionary management services by
broker-dealers. The federal regulation of investment manage-
ment has become so balkanized that current events can be explained
as a movement toward consolidation. For many years, underwrit-
ers, broker-dealers, insurance companies, investment counselors,
and banks, the principals in the securities business, have been
regulated by separate administrative authorities. Even where regu-
lated by one authority, their activities fall under the jurisdiction of
separate organic statutes. At some point, compartmentalized regula-
tion of comparable activities creates discontinuities that generate
172 The Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterps., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.
1973), after graphically describing the operations of the "Dare To Be Great" pyramid scheme,
was quite open in characterizing the definition of securities as functional rather than technical:
[T]he definition of securities should be a flexible one, [and] the word "solely" [in
Howey] should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an
investment contract . . . Rather we adopt a more realistic test, whether the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.
Id. at 482
For a recent example of the willingness of the federal courts on their own initiative to
extend the definition of security on the basis of commonality of services rather than common-
ality of investment decisions, see Safeway Portland Employees Fed. Credit Union v. C.H.
Wagner & Co., 501 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1974) (brokered loan transactions as investment
contracts).
173 It is worth pointing out, however, that as easy as it may be to enter into the
brokerage industry, it is far easier to become a registered investment adviser. Moreover, given
the current state of the law, the costs of being a law-abiding broker-dealer are much greater
than the costs of being a law-abiding investment adviser, for regulation of broker-dealers
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970), is far more
onerous than regulation of investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §1 80b-1 to -21 (1970).
174 See House Study, supra note 4, at 149-50; Senate Study, supra note 4, at 86-87. Cf.
Special Study, supra notek20, at 190.
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unreasonable strain. The natural response is to find a common basis
for regulating the activities of all of these entities as nearly alike as
possible. This is the case with discretionary management.
But the problem is that the SEC lacks the tools to consolidate
properly. A discretionary account, if a security, is not only a security
for every type of manager, but also for every type of discretionary
account. The Securities Act offers no basis for distinguishing the
largest pension fund from the smallest discretionary investment
plan. The Investment Company Act offers no basis for distinguish-
ing a group of discretionary accounts managed alike by an insub-
stantial broker-dealer from a group of institutional accounts man-
aged by an institutional adviser. The consequence of using statutory
authority of questionable relevance to regulate activities that require
agency protection, as appears to be the case now with discretionary
management, is the imposition of costly regulatory burdens on many
other entirely satisfactory arrangements. It may well be that dis-
cretionary management at all levels, and of all types, is in need of
investigation in order to arrive at an appropriate regulatory posture.
But the existing federal securities laws are inadequate to the task.
However much the Commission believes that the advisory activities
of banks, for example, should be brought under its jurisdiction for
certain purposes, the Securities Act is hardly the regulatory tool for
doing so.' 75
 Similarly, however much the SEC believes that small
investors holding securities in discretionary accounts require protec-
tions comparable to those available to shareholders of investment
companies, the Investment Company Act is hardly the proper
means to provide such protections.' 76
The regulation of investment advisory activities under the Se-
curities Act and the Investment Company Act can be criticized on
practical grounds also. Presumably, it is the practices of investment
advisers which require regulation, not their discretionary authority.
Yet, a good many advisers will not accept discretionary authority
"5
 See note 64 supra. The SEC's extension of its jurisdiction to condominium offerings is
another excellent example of the use of the Securities Act to control questionable practices in
circumstances where the fit between the regulated vehicle and the statute is poor, See
Rosenbaum, The Resort Condominium and the Federal Securities Laws—A Case Study in
Governmental Inflexibility, 60 Va. L. Rev. 785 (1974). Accord, Loehwing, Condominiums to
Oysters, Barron's, Jan. 7, 1974, at 5, col, 1.
176
 Should the Investment Company Act be held applicable to management of discre-
tionary accounts, the SEC would have to choose between prohibiting discretionary manage.
ment services or creating great numbers of exemptions from the provisions of the Investment
Company Act for discretionary account managers. One advantage that might flow from
holding the Investment Company Act applicable to discretionary management services would
be the opportunity for creative use of the exemptive power of the SEC under § 6(c) of the
Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-b(c) (1970), to require those providing discretion-
ary management services to meet certain minimum regulatory standards in order to qualify
for exemptions. Sec text at notes 184-86 infra,
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over the accounts they manage even though they are responsible for
selecting investments and timing market moves. To some extent the
refusal to accept discretionary authority may be a reflection of the
expanding scope of the Securities Act and Investment Company
Act. But in many cases, clients themselves either will not or cannot
extend discretionary authority to advisers. 177 In any event, the
relevant distinction in the industry is between managed and unman-
aged accounts rather than between discretionary and non-
discretionary accounts. Indeed both S. 470 and H.R. 5050 took
precisely that line in determining where to limit trading for advisory
accounts. 178
Of course, if the theory takes hold that an investment contract
results from any arrangement in which assets at risk do not belong
to the party responsible for producing the return,'" the Securities
Act and Investment Company Act could apply with equal logic to
all managed accounts, whether discretionary or non-discretionary. A
better answer would be new legislation. Reports from Washington
indicate that Congress is soon to examine the need for expanding the
coverage of the Advisers Act. 18° That would certainly be a good
opportunity for rationalizing the existing disparities. My recommen-
dation, should modification of the Advisers Act be seriously con-
sidered, would be to make the subject of the legislative inquiry far
broader than that single statute. The federal securities laws have
outlived their entity orientation. Investment bankers, broker-
dealers, banks, insurance companies, investment company advisers
and investment counselors are no longer the distinctive organiza-
tions they once were. Everyone, it seems, is getting into everyone
else's business. 18 ' With classifications becoming so blurred, it makes
177 There is some question, for example, whether trustees of an educational or charitable
endowment can give discretionary authority to outside investment managers. See, e.g., Cary
& Bright, The Delegation of Investment Responsibility for Endowment Funds, 74 Colum. L.
Rev. 207 (1974).
1711 See, e.g., S. 470, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), which defines a managed institutional
account:
[Aln account of a bank, insurance company, trust company, investment company,
separate account, pension-benefit or profit-sharing trust or plan, foundation or
charitable endowment fund, or other similar type of institutional account for which
such member or any affiliated person thereof (A) is empowered to determine what
securities shall be purchased or sold, or (B) makes day-to-day decisions as to the
purchase or sale of securities even though some other person may have ultimate
responsibility for the investment decisions for such account.
I" See text at note 45 supra.
18°
 See Wall Street Letter, Sept. 16, 1974 at 7, col. 1.
Banks, for example, are now finding it worthwhile to take on certain brokerage
functions. See Cole, Should Banks Be Allowed a Stockbroker Role?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1974, at 49, cot. 1. Much of the movement into new investment-related services can be
explained as a response to the growing complexity involved in providing financial assistance
to investors of all types, whether individuals, business organizations or institutions. The
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much more sense now to regulate Operations based on what they do
rather than what they call themselves.' 82 Such an approach would
mean that all investment managers handling discretionary accounts
would be able to look to a common source of regulation, and that if
distinctions were to be carved out, such distinctions would be based
on express policy rather than accidents of fate.
Until that time, however, little encouragement can be offered to
broker-dealers involved, or planning to become involved, in provid-
ing investors with discretionary management services. Their expo-
sure under existing law is already great, and with the current
market situation, the number of dissatisfied clients apt to complain
to the SEC or seek civil remedies is surely large and continuing to
grow. As a first step toward rationalizing the existing situation and
protecting broker-dealers from the open-ended liabilities they now
face, the SEC should seriously consider using its rule-making power
to force regulation of discretionary management under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act. It could, through a safe-harbor approach,'"
define "investment contract" under the Securities Act so as to
exclude discretionary accounts managed by registered investment
advisers in compliance with regulatory requirements pertaining to
discretionary management imposed under the Advisers Act.'" In
like fashion, the Commission could condition exemption from the
Investment Company Act on registration under the Advisers Act
adviser able to offer a full range of financial services of high quality including capital
preservation, capital acquisitions, insurance, trading capabilities, custodianship, and so forth,
has a distinct competitive advantage over the adviser whose specialization makes his perspec-
tive more limited. See Welles, Where Will Wall Street Profits Come From?, Institutional
Investor, Sept. 1972, at 33.
L32 This seems to be the approach now being taken by the American Law Institute in its
current engagement to produce a model federal securities code. As Professor Loss, the reporter
for the code, pointed out when the project was first undertaken, the federal securities laws
now contain a great number of conflicting demands arising out of the application of different
statutes to a single transaction or a single activity. He views one of the major contributions of
his efforts for the ALI to be a sharp reduction in these kinds of conflicting jurisdictional
demands. See L. Loss, Federal Securities Code, Reporter's Introductory Memorandum xiii-
xli (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972),
133 See L. Loss, Securities Regulation, ch. 12E, at 1942-43 (1961).
'a4
	
19 of the Securities Act provides: "(a) the Commission shall have authority
from time to time to make .. such rules and regulations as may be necessary for carrying out
the provisions of this title including rules and regulations . . defining accounting, technical,
and trade terms used in this title." 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1970). By defining investment contract to
insulate complying discretionary management services from application of the Securities Act,
the Commission would protect account managers from civil liability under the Act. Section
19(a) further provides:
No provision of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or
omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule or regulation of the Commission,
notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may, after such act or omission, be
amended or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid
for any purpose.
Id.
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and compliance with appropriate regulations. 185 Such a procedure
would not only aid broker-dealers involved in the provision of
discretionary management services, it would also enable the Com-
mission to regUlate many practices of which it apparently disap-
proves but against which it has taken no action. 186 At the very least,
rule-making proceedings would provide a focus for ventilating dif-
ferent points of view about the proper regulatory goals for dealing
with the provision of discretionary management services by invest-
ment advisers of all kinds.
135 Section 6 of the Investment Company Act provides: "(c) The Commission, by rules
and regulations upon its own motion ... may conditionally ... exempt any person, security
or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any
provision or provisions of this subchapter . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6 (1970). An example of
broad and creative use of this exemptive power is its use to promote investor protection in the
offering of variable life insurance by conditioning exemption on adequate supervision by state
insurance commissioners. See note 72 supra.
186 The individualization guidelines suggested for small investors have existed for two
years without any affirmative steps to implement the Committee's recommendations having
been taken. See, e.g., Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 27-32.
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